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Introduction
This dissertation contains three essays on the implications of complementarities on the
equilibrium sorting in the marriage market, and on the optimal bundling of di↵erent
development policies.
This first chapter develops and tests a model of marital sorting on gender-role atti-
tudes and intrahousehold time allocations with search frictions in the marriage market, and
endogenous intrahousehold bargaining power. It is shown that individuals develop a mar-
ital taste for similar gender culture partners in order to avoid conflict in decision-making
within their future households. This incentive for matching assortatively is stronger for
individuals anticipating little say in intrahousehold decision-making. Using data from the
British Household Panel Survey, it is shown that the ability that a woman has to guide the
extensive margin of her labor market supply according to her own gender-role attitudes,
is entirely driven by her search for a same-attitudes partner while in the marriage market.
The second chapter provides empirical evidence on whether health education and mi-
crofinance act as substitutes or complements in reducing neonatal mortality. Identifica-
tion exploits the randomized placement of a health educational intervention in rural India,
stratified by the presence of a pre-existing microfinance intervention, together with the lon-
gitudinal dimension of our dataset. We find that the two interventions substituted each
other: both were more e↵ective when o↵ered in isolation then when o↵ered together. Fur-
ther analysis shows that these interventions operated through di↵erent and substitutable
channels. The health education intervention increased the adoption of hygienic health
behaviours in home deliveries, whereas the microfinance intervention increased payments
made to traditional birth attendants. These findings challenge the preconceived policy no-
tion that complementarities between these two ingredients for development call for their
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joint supply. In contrast, they suggest that policy makers may get more out of each by
o↵ering them in isolation to their communities.
The final chapter analyses a decentralized two-dimensional marriage market model
with transferable utility, where individuals’ attributes are uniformly distributed on the
unit square. I first show that matching of likes along both dimensions is the competitive
equilibrium when the geometric average within-attribute complementarity is greater than
the geometric average between-attribute complementarity. A finding that nests, as a
special case, Becker’s assortative matching result, and is in contrast to previous literature
suggesting that the concept of assortative matching is not well defined in multi-dimensions.
I then show that away from their optimal (similar-type) partners, individuals are willing
to compensate mismatches on one of the attributes with opposite mismatches on the other
attribute. A finding that in turn sheds new light on the trade-o↵s that individuals make in
less than perfectly competitive multidimensional marriage markets, such as those plagued
by search frictions.
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1
Gender Ideology, Marriage, and
Intrahousehold Specialization: Theory and
Evidence from British Couples
1.1 Introduction
Women still spend substantially more time at home and less time in the market than
men, despite the dramatic narrowing of the educational and wage gender gaps in the
past decades.1 Researchers are thus increasingly looking for explanations beyond the
classical insight developed by Becker (1965) based on comparative advantage.2 Within
this new agenda, Ferna´ndez and Fogli (2009), and Farre´ and Vella (2009), provide causal
1For evidence on the persistent pattern of intrahousehold specialization, see e.g. Browning, Chiappori
and Weiss (2011, chap. 1.2). For evidence on the narrowing of the educational and gender wage gaps, see
e.g. Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006) and references therein.
2Becker (1965) informally stated that household members who are relatively less e cient in the market
sector would spend relatively more time in the domestic sector. Becker (1981, chap. 2) formally proved
this proposition.
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empirical evidence that culture, by shaping both the wives and the husbands preferences,
plays a decisive role in explaining this persistent phenomenon of gendered intrahousehold
specialization. Yet little is known on the theoretical mechanisms driving these empirical
patterns.
This paper formalises the conjecture that positive assortative matching on gender-
role preferences in the marriage market acts as a substitute for future intrahousehold
decision-making power on the allocation of spousal times to the market and the domestic
sectors. To the extent that the balance of power between spouses depends on their relative
contributions to household income, and therefore on who does what within the household,
this hypothesis then translates into a specific prediction that will be taken to the data.
This prediction says that the extent to which the impact of a woman’s attitude on the
allocation of time within her household is channeled through the the choice of her partner’s
attitude in the marriage market is greater among more traditional households, wherein
she specialises in the domestic sector and her partner specialises in the market sector.
To understand the intuition behind this idea, imagine a woman wishing to have a
traditional family where she stays at home and specialises in domestic production, whereas
her husband specialises in market production. Suppose further that this woman, while in
the marriage market, expects to have little bargaining power vis-a-vis her future husband
over such intrahousehold time allocation decision. Then, of course, it will be in her best
interest to match with a man who shares with her a preference for traditional gender roles
in the family. Matching with a similar partner will compensate for her lack of say over this
decision, giving her an indirect ability to translate her preference into the intrahousehold
allocation of time. From her perspective, thus, it is as if her husband will be deciding on
her behalf.
But under such intrahousehold time allocation scenario, this woman’s contribution to
the household income will e↵ectively pale in comparison to her husband’s, and so will
her decision-making power. Her expectation, while in the marriage market, of not having
su cient say within her future household, will thus turn out to be correct, justifying her
e↵ort there to find a similar partner. Conversely, her husband, having anticipated to hold
most of the intrahousehold decision-making power, has had a much weaker incentive for
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matching assortatively while in the marriage market. In contrast to his wife therefore, his
ability to translate his gender-role preference into their time allocations will be, mostly, a
direct one.
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, we find a very substantial causal
e↵ect of female gender-roles attitudes on the degree of intrahousehold specialization, which
on average is entirely driven by the fact that more progressive females are matched to more
progressive partners. To the extent that females can choose the attitudes of their partners,
while searching for one in the marriage market, this result provides strong evidence in
favour of our hypothesis. Females, anticipating the need to be backed by their partners over
their labour market participation decisions, appear to strategically develop a (horizontal)
preference for same-attitude partners in the marriage market. A rational strategy since
the more similar they are, the more likely they will be to agree on the optimal decision,
regardless of the balance of power between them.
Moving beyond this finding at the average to analyze its heterogeneity across the
distribution of intrahousehold specialisation distribution, adds furthers support to our hy-
pothesis. As it turns out, this pattern is exclusively concentrated among highly specialized
households, in fact applying only to the extensive margin of female labour market supply.
A finding that is consistent with the idea that females in the vicinity of this margin are
the ones with the lowest degree of bargaining power in household decision making (due
to their reduced contribution to household income), and therefore the ones who have had
the most to gain from matching assortatively on attitudes once in the marriage market.
On top of its contribution to understanding the pathways through which culture, and
more specifically gender ideology, determines specialisation within the household, this
paper therefore also sheds light on the perceived, but mostly atheoretical, notion that
individuals with similar non-productive psychological traits are attracted to each other.3
Here, people care about the gender-role preference of the partner because in equilibrium
it a↵ects the intrahousehold time allocation, over which their own gender-role preferences
are defined. Specifically, a “horizontal” taste for mating with likes on this dimension,
emerges endogenously in response to the fact that who does what within the household is
3Dupuy and Galichon (2012) are the first to provide econometric evidence on assortative matching on
personality traits in the marriage market.
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the outcome of a bargaining process where both spouses’ gender-role preference weigh in.
The organisation of this paper as follows. Section 1.2 develops its main idea formally
with a intrahousehold bargaining model over time allocations with endogenous bargaining
power embedded in a wider marriage market model. Section 1.3 introduces the dataset
used, the British Household Panel Survey, and provides motivating descriptive statistics.
Section 1.4 discusses the econometric framework used to test the model in the data, and
presents the results. Section 1.5 discusses additional issues and concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Analysis
In this section I develop a stylised model of marital sorting on gender-role preferences
followed by intrahousehold bargaining over time allocations with endogenous bargaining
power. The goal is to make precise why and when, the choice of a marriage partner
with compatible gender-role preferences, is a mechanism through which prospective part-
ners improve their ability to influence the subsequent intrahousehold decisions over which
partner does what, according to their own preferences.
While in the marriage market, individuals anticipate the outcome across potential
partners of the subsequent intrahousehold bargaining over time allocations. The model
allows for search frictions in the marriage market and assumes that partners’ utilities are
non-transferable. Both these features are necessary for the household decision to depend
on the balance of power within the household, which is turn assumed to be endogenous.
Following Basu (2006), the model further allows for the intrahousehold bargaining
power to be endogenously determined by the intrahousehold time allocation. This fea-
ture generates the novel prediction that the incentive that an individual has to match
assortatively while in the marriage market is endogenously determined by the future in-
trahousehold time allocation, which in turn feeds into the balance of power between the
spouses.
My model can thus be seen as an extension of the original static model of endogenous
intrahousehold bargaining power developed by Basu (2006), in the sense that here individ-
uals anticipate the equilibrium of that model while searching for a partner in the marriage
market. Search frictions play a crucial role because they generate imperfect positive assor-
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tative matching on gender-role attitudes. In their absence, perfect assortative matching
would unfold, and the model would then collapse to the standard unitary model.
The setup of the model is organized as follows. First, a simple model of intrahousehold
bargaining over time allocations is introduced, where the balance of power between the
spouses is itself a function of their time allocation decisions. After deriving the intra-
household equilibrium as function of partners’ preferences, I then move to the marriage
market, which is populated by a continuum of men and women di↵ering on their pref-
erences. Anticipating the future intrahousehold outcome as a function of their own and
their potential partners’ preferences, each individual chooses a partner to maximize their
expected marital payo↵. In order to be able to empirically allow for independent variation
in partners’ preferences, I then explicitly allow for mismatch to occur in equilibrium due
to search frictions. Finally, I derive implications of the model that will guide the empirical
analysis.
1.2.1 Intrahousehold Bargaining
A household comprises a male m and a female f who can spend their time in the market
sector or in the domestic sector to produce a household public good denoted by c > 0.
Other uses of time are held fixed and the total amount of working time is normalized to
unity. The household production function is given by c = z(hm + hf ), where hi 2 [0, 1]
denotes partner i’s time spent on home production, with i = {m, f}, and z > 0 denotes
purchased good. The household budget constraint is given by z = wmnm + wfnf , where
ni = 1  hi denotes partner i’s time spent in the market, and wi his or her market wage.4
Who does what within the household in order to produce c is captured by the female’s
share of time allocated to the market sector
s =
nf
nm + nf
2 [0, 1]. (1.1)
If s = 1/2, then the partners spend the same amount of time in each sector.5 The further
4This is the standard textbook framework of intrahousehold time allocations (see Browning, Chiappori
and Weiss, 2011).
5Observe that since ni+hi = 1, there is a one-to-one relationship between the female’s share of market
work and her share of domestic work.
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away s is from 1/2, the more specialisation there is within the household. A s < 1/2
captures a ‘traditional’ household where the female spends relatively less time in the
market and more time at home than the male. A s > 1/2 captures a household where
these gender-roles are reversed.
Partners derive utility from two sources. First, from the amount of the household
good c consumed. Second, from the level of intrahousehold specialisation s underlying the
production of c. Specifically, partner i’s utility function is given by
Ui = c  ↵(s  ✓i)
2
2
. (1.2)
where ✓i 2 [0, 1] and ↵   0. This utility function says that the quality of the household
good c consumed, as perceived by partner i, is decreasing in the distance between the real-
ized level of intrahousehold specialization sustaining its production, s, and this partner’s
ideal level of intrahousehold specialization, ✓i. For example, an individual with ✓i < 1/2
wishes c to be produced in a way that is consistent with traditional gender-roles in the
family. The closer ✓i is from 0 the more traditional this individual is. The strength of this
preference over the intrahousehold specialisation is captured by ↵, which for simplicity is
assumed to be the same for both partners.
The household chooses (nm, nf ) in order to solve the following problem
maxnm,nf  Uf + (1   )Um ⌘ z(2  nm   nf )  ↵

 
(s  ✓f )2
2
+ (1   )(s  ✓m)
2
2
 
s.t. z = wmnm + wfnf , and s = nf/(nm + nf ), (1.3)
where   2 [0, 1] captures the balance of power within the household. The greater   is,
the greater the female’s say is in the household’s decision over the choice of (nm, nf ).
Following Basu (2006), this balance of power is endogeneized. Specifically,   is assumed
to be an increasing function of the female’s contribution to the household income y =
wfnf/(wfnf + wmnm), i.e.  0(y) > 0.6 For tractability, the following parameterisation is
6This departs from initial models of intrahousehold decision-making where bargaining power was as-
sumed to be independent of the intrahousehold outcomes themselves (see e.g. Manser and Brown, 1980;
McElroy and Horney, 1981; Sen, 1983; Chiappori, 1988)
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adopted,
  = a+ by, (1.4)
with a 2 (0, 12) and b = 1   2a, implying that b 2 (0, 1).7 Observe that (1.4) implicitly
assumes that the balance of power between the partners tilts at y = 1/2, i.e.   > (<)1/2
when y > (<)1/2.8
Intrahousehold Equilibrium
To start things o↵, suppose for a moment that ↵ = 0, i.e. partners only care about
the amount of c consumed.9 In such case, there is nothing to bargain over and the
solution to problem (1.3) is entirely driven by e ciency reasons, reprising Becker’s result
of intrahousehold specialization based on comparative advantage (Becker, 1981, chap. 2).
That is, if wi > wj , then the higher wage partner fully specialises in market work, ni = 1,
and the lower wage partner fully specialises in domestic work, nj = 0. If instead both
partners have the same wage w, then from an e ciency perspective who does what within
the household becomes irrelevant, as long as nm and nf are such that
nf = 1  nm ⌘ s. (1.5)
In the absence of a comparative advantage thus any level of intrahousehold specialisa-
tion s 2 [0, 1] is equally e cient and generates the same amount of household good c = w.
In the rest of the analysis, I will assume away comparative advantages in order to focus
on the partners’ gender role preferences.
Suppose now that ↵ > 0, i.e. partners also care about how the household good c is
produced. In such case, the solution to problem (1.3) still satisfies (1.5), but now it further
7This parameterization of the bargaining power function rules out multiplicity of equilibria within the
household. To be specific, su cient conditions in my setting for uniqueness are a > 0 and monotonicity of
the slope (i.e. at most a quadratic function). For multiplicity of equilibria scenarios see Basu (2006).
8Naturally, the exact location of this threshold level of relative income that tilts the balance of power
within the household is an empirical question. What is important to retain here is that monotonicity of  
with respect to y implies that such threshold exists.
9In such case the framework would collapse to the standard textbook setting used to explain Becker’s
comparative advantage theory (see Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2011).
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entails the following condition
s =  ✓f + (1   )✓m. (1.6)
That is, when the partners directly care about their relative roles in the family, they choose
a specific level of intrahousehold specialisation along the e ciency schedule s 2 [0, 1], which
is an average of their ideal levels, ✓f and ✓m, weighted by their relative bargaining powers.
But the balance of power   depends itself on the outcome s. Specifically, given that
wm = wf , the power function (1.4) simplifies to
  = a+ bs =
1 + b(2s  1)
2
. (1.7)
Hence, the intrahousehold equilibrium must simultaneously satisfy (1.7) and (1.6), entail-
ing the equilibrium level of intrahousehold specialisation
smf =
✓f + ✓m   b(✓f   ✓m)
2(1  b(✓f   ✓m)) , (1.8)
and the equilibrium balance of power
 mf =
1  b(1  2✓m)
2(1  b(✓f   ✓m)) . (1.9)
It can be readily verified from (1.8) and (1.9) that the ability that each partner has to
translate his or her own preference into the chosen level of intrahousehold specialisation
depends itself on this outcome, and therefore on their preferences. If the partners have
su ciently traditional preferences, then the male will be more influential than the female.
Specifically, if ✓m + ✓f < 1, then @smf/@✓m > @smf/@✓f . The more traditional the
couple is, the greater this imbalance in power is. This is because s is increasing in both
partners’ preference parameters, and therefore so it will be the female’s decision-making
power. If the couple is su ciently ‘progressive’, then she becomes more influential than
her. Specifically if ✓m + ✓f > 1, then @smf/@✓m < @smf/@✓f since s, y,  > 1/2.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the intrahousehold equilibrium (1.8) and (1.9) for an hypothetical
couple (✓m, ✓f ). The horizontal axis measures the level of specialization s. The vertical
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axis measures the balance of power  . The steeper line represents the specialization func-
tion (1.6). The flatter curve represents the power function (1.7). The intrahousehold
equilibrium is given by the intersection of these two lines. Observe that since these part-
ners’ preferences are such that ✓m+✓f < 1, the equilibrium s is closer to ✓m than it is from
✓f , i.e. the male has a greater ability to impose his own preference. This is a consequence
of s being less than 1/2 within this household, allowing the male to be more influential
than the female, i.e. s < 1/2.
1.2.2 Marriage Market
The marriage market is populated by a continuum of women and men whose types, in-
dexed by ✓f and ✓m respectively, are both assumed to follow a uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. I assume that these preference parameters are publicly observable, and hence, while
in the marriage market, individuals perfectly anticipate the intrahousehold equilibrium
associated with each potential choice of a partner.
Individual ✓i’s marital payo↵ from matching with partner ✓j , Vij , is thus obtained
by plugging the equilibrium intrahousehold specialisation sij , given by (1.8), and the
associated amount of household good c = w produced, into his or her utility function,
given by (1.2),
Vij = w    ij (✓j   ✓i)
2
2
. (1.10)
After simple algebra it can be shown that  fm = ↵[(1    ?f )/(1   ( ?f    ?m))]2 and
 mf = ↵[ ?m/(1   ( ?f    ?m))]2, where  ?f = a + b✓f captures the female ✓f ’s bargaining
power when matched with a male with a preference similar to her own, i.e. when her
partner’s type is ✓m = ✓f ; and 1  ?m = 1 a  b✓m captures the male’s bargaining power
when matched with a female with a preference similar to his own, i.e. when his partner’s
type is ✓f = ✓m.
Marital Preferences
Specification (1.10) allows to fully characterise both men and women marital preferences
across all potential matches in the marriage market. Three characteristics are of particular
interest. First, both have an endogenous mating preference for partners with gender-role
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preferences similar to their own.10 Specifically, marital payo↵s (1.10) are maximized at
✓j = ✓i. To see this let   = ✓f   ✓m measure the mismatch between a female ✓f and a
male ✓m. Di↵erentiating (1.10) with respect to  , it follows that the marginal cost of a
mismatch for a female is given by MCf =  (1   ?f )2/(1  b )3, and for a male it is given
by MCm =   ?m
2/(1   b )3, which are both equal to zero at   = 0.11 The intuition
behind this result is that whomever they end up matching with, the resulting equilibrium
level of intrahousehold specialisation will be an average of their ideals’, and as a result
matching with a similar partner ensures their most preferred outcome.
Second, the strength of this mating preference for similarity that women have in the
marriage market is increasing in their own degree of traditionality, i.e.  @MCf/@✓f > 0.
The intuition for this result is clear. More traditional women will have in equilibrium lower
bargaining power, which will reduce their ability to pull s towards ✓f , thus magnifying
their loss from a mismatch. The opposite holds for men, whose cost of mismatching
is decreasing in their own degree of traditionality, as confirmed by @MCm/@✓m > 0.
Traditional men will have greater bargaining power in household decision-making, making
them less concerned with matching with women whose gender-role preferences are di↵erent
than their own.
Third, women particularly dislike men who are more traditional than themselves, i.e.
men such that ✓m < ✓f . Conversely, men particularly dislike women who are less tradi-
tional than themselves, i.e. women such that ✓f > ✓f . To confirm that this is indeed the
case for women, just compare MCf when   = " > 0 to than when   =  " < 0. It is
readily verified that the latter is greater than the former. The reason for this asymmetry
is because the balance of power within the household changes di↵erently across these two
types of mismatches. Figure 1.2 explains the intuition behind this result. It depicts intra-
household equilibria involving a female ✓f matched with three alternative men: (i) one as
traditional as herself, ✓m = ✓f , (ii) one more traditional than herself, ✓0m < ✓f , and (iii)
another one less traditional than herself, ✓00m > ✓f .
10In Chiappori and Ore ce (2008), individuals also develop an endogenous horizontal preference for
matching with individuals with attitudes towards fertility similar to their own. However, in their paper
the marriage market is assumed to be frictionless, utilities are transferable, and bargaining power is not
endogenously determined by the intrahousehold outcomes (fertility choices in their case).
11In addition, observe that marital payo↵s are globally concave in  , confirming that zero mismatches
are optimal.
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If the woman depicted in Figure 1.2 matches with the man ✓m = ✓f , she is able to
experience her ideal degree of intrahousehold specialisation s = ✓f = ✓m, and her decision-
making power in such relationship is given by  . Suppose now that she matches with the
more traditional male ✓0m < ✓f . The following e↵ects will unfold. First, if her level of
say within this new relationship were to stay the same as before,  , then the new level
of specialisation taking into account the fact that this man is more traditional than the
previous one, would be s˜ =  ✓f + (1    )✓0m < s. However, if her share of market work
reduces, so will her relative contribution to household income, and therefore a transfer
of power to her new partner will take place. Under s˜, her new bargaining power will be
 ˜ <  , which will in turn feed into a new decrease in s, further away from her ideal and
closer to her partner’s ideal. This process eventually converges to (s0, 0).
Suppose now that this woman instead matches with the more progressive man ✓00m > ✓f .
If her bargaining power were to stay the same as when matched with ✓m = ✓f , at  , the
allocation of time within this new household would then be sˆ =  ✓f + (1   )✓00m > s. But
under s˜, her bargaining power will increase to  ˆ >  , enabling her to o↵set part of the
increase in s, pulling it closer to her ideal s = ✓f . This process eventually converges to
(s00, 00). Clearly, the distance between s0 and s is larger than that between s00 and s, and
as a result the loss in her surplus from a mismatch is greater when it involves a man more
traditional than herself. We could use a similar line of argument to show that the exact
opposite holds for men. Men would rather mismatch with traditional women than with a
progressive women, since the latter is associated with a reduction in their own bargaining
power.
Search Frictions
Given these mating preferences, endogenously driven by the anticipation of the intrahouse-
hold equilibria in the marriage market, the natural question is then: who matches with
whom? In the absence of any frictions in this market, the answer would also be quite
natural: individuals would maximize their marital payo↵s (1.10), and the marriage mar-
ket equilibrium would entail perfect positive assortativeness on gender-role preferences.
That is, and individual of type ✓i would match with a partner of type ✓j = ✓i. But such
20
outcome would jeopardise the very purpose of this paper, as a perfect correlation in part-
ners’ preferences would render impossible the task of breaking down the e↵ect of partners’
preferences on their time allocations, into their direct component and their assortative
matching component.
I thus need to generate some degree of imperfect assortativeness. Following the tra-
dition in the marriage market literature, the route I take here is to assume the presence
of search frictions in this marriage market. An elegant and parsimonious way to do this
is to adopt the search technology developed by Atakan (2006), and further simplified by
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011).12 Specifically, this technology assumes that the marriage
market involves two rounds. In the first round, men and women are randomly paired.
They then have the option to either stay together for free or, at a cost c > 0, move into
the second round where they will meet with certainty their payo↵ maximising partners as
in the frictionless word.
A type ✓i will thus accept to match with a type ✓j , who has randomly met with in the
first round, if the payo↵ he or she derives in such marriage is greater than the net payo↵
that he or she can obtain if instead decides to enter into the second round and marry with
a type ✓j = ✓i. Using (1.10), this condition becomes
(✓j   ✓i)2  2c/ ij , (1.11)
which can be solved for ✓i in order to obtain this type’s acceptance set in the marriage
market, Ai ✓ [0, 1], that is the set of types ✓j 2 [0, 1] that he or she is willing to match
with.
Women’s Acceptance Sets
After lengthy algebra, it can be shown that the acceptance set of a female ✓f is given by
Af = {✓m 2 [0, 1] | ✓f +  f    f  ✓m  ✓f +  f +  f} , (1.12)
12A crucial aspect that sets apart my analysis from theirs, is that here I explicitly endogeneize the
balance power within a partnership, whereas they assume it to be exogenous. Another important way
in which my analysis di↵ers from theirs, is that here I am working with a setup where partners’ utility
are non-transferable (as in Shimer and Smith (2000)), whereas in their setup partners’ utilities are fully
transferable.
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where  f = 2bc/↵[(1  ?f )2 2b2c/↵] > 0, and  f = [(1  ?f )
p
2c/↵]/[(1  ?f )2 2b2c/↵] >
0. The interpretation of (1.12) follows closely the one used to characterise women’s marital
preferences, and the following two key features are in order.
First, this female ✓f accepts an interval of men’s types ✓m symmetrically defined around
✓f +  f , i.e. around her own type plus a small adjustment term. That her own type ✓f
is anchoring the left and right-hand sides of her acceptance set, follows from the idea
that her payo↵ maximising partner is a man with a gender-role preference similar to her
own. That, however, she adjusts upwards the centre of her acceptance set by the term  f ,
follows from the idea that, conditional on mismatching, women have a preference for men
who are more progressive than themselves. It can be shown however that for small c this
term is negligible.
Second, more traditional women are choosier, as their acceptance sets are narrower
than those of more progressive women, i.e. @ f/@✓f = (@ f/@ ?f ) ⇥ (@ ?f/@✓f ) > 0.
This follows from the idea that more traditional women, anticipating less decision-making
power within their future households, have more to loose from a mismatch in preferences.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the acceptance sets of all females in the market, that is the
females’ acceptance region. The concentric filled curves departing from the 450 degree
line are the contours of the marital payo↵ function (1.10) for the females. Among these,
the contour coinciding with the 450 line indicates the payo↵ level for women matched
with men with preferences similar to their own. Hence, this is the highest possible payo↵.
Contours further away from the 450 line indicate successively smaller marital payo↵s for
women that are increasingly mismatched. The dashed straight lines are the contours of
the equilibrium intrahousehold specialisation function (1.8). Among these, the contour
coinciding with the  450 line indicates couples wherein there is no specialisation, i.e.
combinations of (✓m, ✓f ) 2 [0, 1]2 such that smf = 0.5. Contours further to the left of the
 450 line indicate increasingly specialised couples wherein females spend increasingly less
time in the market and more at home than their partners, smf < 0.5. Contours further to
the right of  450 line indicate increasingly specialised couples, but in the opposite way,
i.e. couples wherein females spend increasingly more time in the market and less time at
home than their partners, smf > 0.5. The absolute value of the slope of a given contour k,
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given by |@✓m/@✓f |k =  ?m/(1  ?f )|k, indicates the balance of power within these couples
as measured by their partners’ level of decision-making power when these are matched
with their outside-option payo↵-maximising partners.
Women’s acceptance sets in the marriage market are given by the shaded region in
Figure 1.3, which has the following two basic primitives. First, the contours of the women’s
marital payo↵s (1.10) given by the concentric curves departing from the 450 degree line.
Among these, the contour coinciding with the 450 line indicates the payo↵ level for women
matched with men with preferences similar to their own. Hence, this is the highest possible
payo↵. Contours further away from the 450 line indicate successively smaller marital
payo↵s for women within couples where partners are increasingly mismatched.
Second, the contours of the equilibrium intrahousehold specialisation function (1.8),
which are given by the dashed straight lines. Each of these contours gives a set of cou-
ples, within each the equilibrium time allocation entails a particular constant degree of
specialisation smf . Among these, the contour coinciding with the  450 line indicates
couples wherein there is no specialisation, i.e. combinations of (✓m, ✓f ) 2 [0, 1]2 such
that smf = 0.5. Contours further to the left of the  450 line indicate increasingly spe-
cialised couples wherein females spend increasingly less time in the market and more
at home than their partners, smf < 0.5. Contours further to the right of  450 line
indicate increasingly specialised couples, but in the opposite way, i.e. couples wherein
females spend increasingly more time in the market and less time at home than their
partners, smf > 0.5. The absolute value of the slope of a given contour k, given by
|@✓m/@✓f |k =  ?m/(1   ?f )|k, indicates the balance of power within these couples as mea-
sured by their partners’ level of decision-making power when these are matched with their
outside-option payo↵-maximising partners.
Taken together with the information contained by these two contour maps, the shape
of the shaded region in graph depicted by Figure 1.3, which captures the acceptance sets
of all women in the market, makes geometrically precise the analytical arguments just
made. Specifically, the women’s acceptance region is a band that is approximately centred
along the perfectly positive assortative matching schedule, whose thickness is decreasing
in the degree of traditionality of women. This narrowing e↵ect is the result of more
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traditional women being more choosy in anticipation of their reduced say within their
future households, as captured by the flattening pattern of the iso-specialization contours
as we approach the origin of the graph.
Men’s Acceptance Sets
The acceptance set of men ✓m is, in turn, given by
Am = {✓f 2 [0, 1] | ✓m    m    m  ✓f  ✓m    m +  m} , (1.13)
where  m = 2bc/↵[ ?m
2   2b2c/↵] > 0, and  m = [ ?m
p
2c/↵]/[ ?m
2   2b2c/↵] > 0. The
interpretation of (1.13) is the inverse of that used to understand women’s acceptance sets.
In particular, men accept an interval of women whose types ✓f are symmetrically defined
around ✓m    m, i.e. around his own type minus an adjustment term. This adjustment
term captures the idea previously discussed that men, conditional on mismatching, have a
preference for women who are more traditional than themselves. Again, this adjustment
term can be shown to be negligible. Furthermore, traditional men, i.e. those with lower
✓m, are less choosy. This is because these type of men anticipate a rather large level of
decision-making within their future households, and therefore are prepared to accept a
wider range of females.
Figure 1.4 depicts the acceptance sets of all men in the marriage market, together
with the contours of their marital payo↵s. It can be see, that these are the mirror-image
around the  450 line of those of women, precisely capturing the asymmetric nature of
marital preferences across gender.
Marriage Market Equilibrium
Marriage is a voluntary decision, hence individuals’ acceptance sets are in principal not
enough to define who matches with whom. It may well be that an individual may be
willing to match with a particular partner, but not the other way round.13 As a result,
such marriage should never occur. We thus need to introduce an additional concept, that
13As it is well known, this is the result of non-transferability between partners’ payo↵s (see, e.g. Smith
(2006)).
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of opportunity sets. The opportunity set of an individual whose type is ✓i, is the set
of potential partners that are willing to match with him or her, and therefore given by
Oi = {✓j 2 [0, 1] | ✓i 2 Aj}. This type’s matching set, i.e. who he or she actually ends up
marrying with, is given byMi = Ai\Oi. These matching sets across the entire population
in the marriage market, thus define the marriage market equilibrium.
The solution to the marriage market equilibrium is simple, and illustrated in Figure
1.5. Amongst the segment of the marriage market population such that couples formed
therein are associated with an intrahousehold balance of power tilted in favour of men,
i.e. the region in the graph below the  450 line, who matches with whom is entirely
determined by womens’ acceptance region, as this lies strictly within that of the men’s.
On the opposite side of the population, where women within any couple that forms there
have greater say than their partners, the matching region is entirely driven by the men’s
acceptance region.
To confirm this result, observe that from the individuals’ acceptance rules given by
(1.11), the largest mismatch accepted by women satisfies (✓f   ✓m)2 = 2c/ fm, whereas
the largest mismatch accepted by men satisfies (✓f   ✓m)2 = 2c/ fm. It thus follows
that women (men) are choosier than men (women) when  fm > (<)  mf , that is when
 ?m < (>) 1  ?f . Naturally, they are equally choosy, when  ?m = 1  ?f . That is, along the
knife-edge set of potential couples (✓m, ✓f ) along the  450 line in Figure 1.5, the women’s
acceptance region coincides with that of men.
1.2.3 Mapping the Theory to the Data
Recall that the goal of this paper is to argue that positive assortative matching on gender-
role preferences is a mechanism through which individuals, who anticipate little bargaining
power within their future households, use in order to implement their own preferences.
According to the model just developed, the marginal impact of the females’ (or males’)
gender-role preferences on the average degree of specialisation within their households, acts
through the following two additive channels
dE(s(✓f , ✓m)|✓f )
d✓f
=
@s(✓f , E[✓m|✓f ])
@✓f
+
dE[✓m|✓f ]
d✓f
⇥ @s(✓f , E[✓m|✓f ])
@✓m
. (1.14)
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The first term on the right-hand side of (1.14) is the direct channel. It captures the average
impact of a marginal increase in her preference parameter on the degree of intrahousehold
specialisation, keeping fixed the average preference parameter of her partner E[✓m|✓f ].
The second term, is the assortative matching channel. It captures the following sequence
of e↵ects. First, a marginal increase in the woman’s preference parameter leads to an
increase in the average preference parameter of her partner, through a di↵erent choice of
a partner in the marriage market. Second, this will in turn further add to the change in
the average degree of intrahousehold specialisation.
It can be shown that for small search costs c, individuals are on average approximately
perfectly positively sorted on gender-role preferences, i.e. E[✓m|✓f ] ⇡ ✓f . As a result, using
the solution to the intrahousehold equilibrium specialisation smf , given by (1.8), the direct
channel is approximately equal to
@s(✓f , E[✓m|✓f ])
@✓f
=
1  b(1  2E[✓m|✓f ])
2[1  b(✓f   E[✓m|✓f ])]2 ⇡
1  b(1  2✓f )
2
, (1.15)
and the matching channel is approximately equal to
dE[✓m|✓f ]
@✓f
⇥ @s(✓f , E[✓m|✓f ])
@✓m
⇡ 1 + b(1  2✓f )
2[1  b(✓f   E[✓m|✓f ])]2 ⇡
1 + b(1  2✓f )
2
, (1.16)
whose sum (1.14) leads to a constant overall e↵ect dE[s(✓f , ✓m)|✓f ]/d✓f ⇡ 1. Yet, (1.15)
and (1.16) reveal that the relative weight of its two channels varies across the distribution
of women’s gender-role preferences. Specifically, the di↵erence between the assortative
matching channel and the direct channe, b(1   2✓f ), is decreasing in ✓f . The former
dominates the latter when ✓f < 0.5.
The intuition for this result is simple. Among su ciently traditional women, their
ability to directly influence the intrahousehold decision-making process is limited, and
therefore the impact of their gender-role preferences on the time allocation within their
households is mostly channeled through their choices of partners in the marriage market,
with preferences on average similiar to their own.
Further observe that since E[✓m|✓f ] ⇡ ✓f , using (1.8) we have that E[s(✓f , ✓m)|✓f ] ⇡
2✓f . An alternative way to put the above prediction is then that the average impact
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of women’s gender role preferences on the degree of intrahousehold specialisation varies
across the distribution of the latter. In particular, the assortative matching channel will
dominates the direct channel among more traditional couples, that is, among couples
where the woman specialises in the domestic sector and the man specialises in the market
sector. It is this prediction that I will take to the data.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study comes from the British Household Panel Survey that began in
1991 with approximately 5,500 households in Great Britain. Every year since then, adult
members of these households were asked to report about how many hours in a typical week
they expected to spend in their market job and in domestic chores, and every other year
they were asked to report their degree of agreement with a set of six statements about the
relative roles of women and men in the family and in the market. Our sample is restricted
to years where both time use and attitudes data are available, and to adult respondents
who where either married or cohabiting and living together with their partners. We further
dropped respondents that reported to be full-time students, unemployed, or retired.
1.3.1 Intrahousehold Specialization
Table 1.1 describes the main features of the data on intrahousehold time allocations. There
are clear gender asymmetries within the household in the distributions of time allocated to
the market and the domestic sectors. Nearly all men work full-time in the labour market
(  35 hours/week) and allocate no more than 10 hours a week to the domestic sector. In
contrast, only 41% of women work full-time in labour market, 18% do not participate at
all there, and 62% work more than 10 hours a week in the domestic sector. Specifically,
during a typical week men allocate an average 38 hours to the market and 5 hours to the
household, whereas women allocate 24 hours to their market jobs and 16 hours to domestic
chores.
There is also an important gender asymmetry in the degree of dispersion of these dis-
tributions. The standard deviations of the women’s time allocated to the market and to
the domestic sectors are more than twice as large as those of their partners. Women com-
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pensate compensate additional work in the labour market with less work in the domestic
sector. More precisely, a one hour increase in their market work is on average associated
with a 18.2 minutes decrease in the amount of time they allocate to domestic chores.14
The scant variability in men’s time allocations implies that spousal time uses are mostly
independent from each other.15
This picture of gender asymmetry in intrahousehold time allocations, stemming from
the joint analysis of both spouses’ times allocated to the market and to the domestic
sectors, can be summarized into a single measure capturing the degree of intrahousehold
specialization
smf =
✓
nf
nf + hf
◆
⇥
✓
nm
nm + hm
◆ 1
(1.17)
where ni and hi denote partner i’s number of hours per week allocated to the market and
to the domestic sectors, respectively. If smf < 1, we then say that the female is specialised
in the domestic sector relative to her partner, and vice-versa if smf > 1. If smf = 1,
then there is no specialization within this household since the own shares of working
time that each spouse allocates to the market sector are equal.16 Figure 1.6 shows the
sample distribution of this measure. In 88% of the households, women are specialized
in the domestic sector relative to their partners. The large mass point at zero captures
households where women do not participate at all in the labour market. In the typical
household, the woman’s own share of market work corresponds to approximately 63% to
that of her partner’s.
Appendix Figure 1.A1 plots changes in smf over the female’s life-cycle for each of the
four major cohorts in the data. Each curve represents a cohort. We can see that these
curves link to each other on a fairly continuous and smooth fashion. If there were large
cohort e↵ects, these curves should be shifted away from each other. This series is thus
dominated by life-cycle e↵ects, rather than by cohort e↵ects. The shape the life-cycle
trend show the well known U-shaped profile of female participation in the labor market.
14This estimate was obtained from an OLS regression of the women’s time allocated to the market sector
to the time they allocate to the domestic sector.
15This stands in contrast with the conventional theoretical approach of modelling a correlation in part-
ners’ time uses stemming from comparative advantages arguments.
16See Pollak (2011) for a discussion on the di↵erent meanings of specialization in economic theory and
in ordinary language.
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This profile reflects the impact of child bearing on labour supply, especially during the
child’s early years.
1.3.2 Gender-Role Attitudes
One of the six statements on gender roles reads: “a husband’s jobs is to earn money, a wife’s
job is to look after the home and family.” The five answer categories were labelled from
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Basic descriptives reported in Appendix Table
1.A1 and in Appendix Figures 1.A2 and 1.A3, reveal a considerable degree of heterogeneity
in the answers to all the statements, most of which driven by the cross-sectional dimension
of the dataset, as seen in Columns 3 and 6 of Table 1.A1. This finding indicates that
attitudes are a persistent subjective trait across time, which will motivate the use of
cross-sectional approaches in our econometric analysis.
It is well understood that subjective data of this type may be measured with error
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). As a first step to overcome this problem, rather
than using the responses to these questions directly, I employ an Item Response Theory
(IRT) framework in order to estimate the underlying common component driving all of
the responses.17 Specifically, I use the IRT semiparametric estimation procedure devel-
oped by Spady (2010), whose details are summarized in Appendix 1.A.18 The resulting
individual-level index is then taken to be the measure of gender role attitudes, whose
sample distribution, split by gender, is shown in the Appendix Figure 1.A4. Higher values
of this index are associated with more progressive views (or, equivalently, lower values
are associated with more traditional views). Figures 1.A5 and 1.A6 in the Appendix in
turn, show that the variation in attitudes in the data is mostly driven by heterogeneity
across marriages within cohorts rather than across cohorts These figures plot changes in
both males and females’ attitudes over the life-cycle for the four key cohorts in the data.
Similarly to we saw for intrahousehold specialization in Figure 1.A1, these curves link to
each other on a fairly continuous and smooth fashion, thus indicating that they dominated
17This approach of reducing the dimensionality of these measures into their common component is
supported by the large Cronbach’s alpha reliability coe cients reported in the footnote of Appendix Table
1.A1.
18Despite the advantages of this method relative to standard factor and principal component analyses
(Spady, 2010), our results are robust if we instead use those alternative methods.
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by life-cycle e↵ects, rather than by cohort e↵ects.
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show the cumulative distribution function of our measure of intra-
household specialization (1.17) conditional on the quartiles of each partner’s attitudinal
distribution. These figures clearly indicate that both more progressive women and men
are more likely to come from households where there is less specialisation.19 Figure 1.A7
in the Appendix further shows that this relationship between gender role attitudes and
intrahousehold specialization holds within the di↵erent cohorts.20 It is however possible
that the observed change across time in average allocation of time within the household
may be in part driven by cohort level factors, other than changes in attitudes. One way to
think about this is to realize that in fact each cohort represents a di↵erent marriage mar-
ket, each possibly driving a di↵erent within-household distribution of bargaining power
and therefore household resources. For example, it is well known that the increased fe-
male labor force participation has been accompanied by a reduction in the wage gender
gap across these cohorts. In order to mitigate the presence of cohort level confounders, it
will thus be important to control for cohort fixed e↵ects in the econometric analysis.
At same time, Figure 1.9, which plots for each value of the female attitude the av-
erage attitude of her partner, shows a strong positive pattern of correlation in spousal
attitudes.21 To the extent that the choice of a partner in the marriage market precedes
the intrahousehold decision-making process, but follows the formation of these attitudes,
then the idea put forward in the theoretical section of this paper - that the impact of
individuals’ gender-role preferences on the allocation of time within their households is,
in part, channeled through their choices of spouses with gender-role preferences similar to
their own - may be true.
19A supplementary descriptive regression analysis on the relationship between intrahousehold time allo-
cations and attitudes is presented in Appendix 1.B.
20This figure focus on women’s birth cohorts, but men’s cohorts generate a very similar pattern.
21The (OLS) correlation between partners’ attitudes is 0.404 (s.e.=0.008), as reported in Column 8 of
Appendix Table 1.A1.
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1.4 Econometric Analysis
1.4.1 Strategy
My econometric strategy is as follows. First, I estimate the total causal e↵ect of both
women’s and men’s attitudes on the degree of specialization within their households, i.e.
without controlling for their partners’ attitudes. I then control for their partners’ attitudes
and see how those initial coe cients change. A decrease in their magnitude will indicate
that part of that total e↵ect is channeled through their behaviour in the marriage market
whereby they match with a similar-attitude partner. To incorporate the idea that this
assortative matching channel depends on the balance of power within the household, and
this in turn on the intrahousehold time allocations themselves, I perform this exercise
across di↵erent points of the intrahousehold specialization distribution.
Clearly, the very first econometric concern is that the descriptive evidence of Section
1.3, indicating a correlation between partners’ attitudes and the degree of intrahousehold
specialisation, may not be necessarily causal. This is so due to the classical endogene-
ity concerns: reverse causality, measurement error, and omitted variables bias. Reverse
causality is a strong possibility in our setting since individuals’ attitudes may be partially
rationalizing the actual gender roles’ setting that they face within their homes in order to
avoid cognitive dissonance problems (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982). Alternatively, reverse
causality can be the result of a self-inference process that individuals go though if they
are uncertain about their own “deep values” (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011; Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2001).
Furthermore, despite the rigorous approach taken in Section 1.3 to estimate latent
attitudes from observed self-reported attitudes, I remain doubtful that those became free
of measurement error. For example, traditional individuals may fear being labelled “con-
servative” at a time where society tends to give support to sophisticated attitudes towards
gender roles. It is well known that the presence of measurement error may attenuate
causal inference, a problem that is magnified if the inference is based on within-variation
and the regressor of interest is persistent across time (see e.g. Griliches and Hausman,
1986). At a minimum then, in this context, preference should be given for an estimation
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procedure based on cross-sectional variation.
Finally, attitudes may also be correlated with unobservables that are themselves cor-
related with intrahousehold time allocations. An obvious example of such an omitted
variable could be partners’ relative productivities in the market and in the domestic sec-
tors. Inference that ignores such possibilities may then be biased. Observe that these
may also be coupled with measurement error issues. For example, females lacking labour
market skills may feel a discomfort with it, and as result adopt a wishful-thinking coping
mechanism where they pretend to adhere to traditional views about gender roles.
I tackle these three concerns simultaneously by employing a (cross-sectional) Instru-
mental Variable (IV) approach, whereby motivated by the theoretical contribution of
Ferna´ndez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) on the intergenerational transmission of gender-role
preferences, I instrument respondents’ attitudes with information on whether their moth-
ers were participating in the labour market when they were growing up.22 This approach
will identify the causal e↵ects of the spousal gender-role attitudes, if the association be-
tween these childhood experiences and the degree of intrahousehold specialisation takes
place only through these attitudes.
One however may be skeptical about the validity of this “exclusion restriction”. Indeed,
one could argue that the partners’ mothers labour market statuses could have created a
chain of events, parallel to the formation of their attitudes, that ultimately also contributed
to explain the current time allocations within their household. For example, the labour
market participation decision of their mothers could have been influenced by the amount
of labour market income brought home by their fathers. This background socio-economic
status could have in turn directly influenced the respondents’ educational investments
and career aspirations. Alternatively, one could argue that a working mother provides
less parenting support to her children, which again could have had a direct influence on
respondents’ educational performance and career prospects (see e.g., Belsky et al., 2007).
In order to mitigate these threats to the identification ability of our instrument, it will
therefore be important to condition the ensuing analysis on observable measures capturing
22A strategy also followed by Farre´ and Vella (2009) using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, to
estimate the (total) causal e↵ect of spousal gender-role attitudes on the extensive margin of female labour
market supply.
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these potential confounding channels through which the instrument can also a↵ect the
degree of intrahousehold specialisation.
1.4.2 The Total E↵ect of Spousal Gender-Role Attitudes
My first task is to estimate the total causal e↵ect of both the wives’ and the husbands’
attitudes on the degree of specialization within their households. In practice, the IV
approach followed here is implemented with a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) model,
ran separately for wives and husbands, whose second-stage equation is given by
si = ↵
0xi +  ai + "i, (1.18)
where si is the degree of intrahousehold specialisation within the respondent i’s household,
defined in (1.17), and xi is a vector of control variables. These include basic controls,
namely both the respondent’s and his or her spouse’s age, and cohort dummies; plus a set
of variables addressing the previously discussed concerns on the validity of the exclusion
restriction. Specifically, these additional controls are the socio-economic status of the
respondent’s father, the type of school he or she attended (namely, whether comprehensive
or secondary modern), and the age he or she left school. The parameter of interest is  ,
which captures the causal e↵ect of respondent i’s gender-role attitude ai.23 Both here and
in the first-stage equation below, standard errors are clustered both at the individual and
at the time level (Thompson, 2011; Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2011). Clustering at
the individual level allows for error terms to be correlated within individual across time.
This is particularly important given the persistency of attitudes. Clustering at the year
level allows for shocks that induce correlation across individuals in a moment in time.
The first-stage equation for this 2SLS model is
ai =  
0xi + ⇡zi + ⌘i (1.19)
where zi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother of individual i worked when he
23Observe that none of the variables in specification (1.18) has a time subscript because the instrumental
variable used only varies across, and not within, individuals. Furthermore, a cross-sectional analysis in our
context seems appropriate in light of our previous descriptive finding indicating that most of the sample
variation in attitudes is cross-sectional.
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or she was 14, i.e. the instrumental variable. Standardized estimates of ⇡, the first-stage
e↵ect of the instrument on the respondent’s attitude, are reported in Panels A and B of
Table 1.2, for wives and husbands respectively. These estimates show a substantial and
significant positive relationship between the instrument and the respondent’s attitude. On
average, a woman whose mother was a labour market participant when she was aged 14
is .165 standard deviations (hereafter,  ) more progressive than a female whose mother
was fully specialised in the domestic sector (s.e.=0.018). The instrument is rather strong
as suggested by the very large F-statistic reported at the bottom of the table. A similar
result holds for men. On average, men whose mothers worked when they were 14 years of
age are a substantial .125  more progressive than men whose mothers did not work.
The 2SLS results are reported in Panels A and B of Table 1.3, for wives and husbands
respectively. Column 1 shows that a   increase in the wife’s attitude leads to an increase
of 26 percentage points (s.e.=4.3) in her own share of market work relative to her spouses’
own shares of market work. That is, it virtually eliminates the sample mean degree of
intrahousehold specialisation of 62.2%, which is reported at the top of the column. A
similar e↵ect, both in terms of magnitude and significance, is found for the husband’s
attitude. 24
Moving beyond this average e↵ect, Columns 2-5 focus on the total e↵ects of both
the wives’ and husbands’ attitudes on the likelihood that degree of specialisation within
their households exceeds some particular threshold. That is, each of these columns takes
1[s > q] for consecutively higher choices of q as the outcome variable in the second-stage
Eq.(1.18). Column 2 presents estimates for the case where q = 0, i.e. for the total e↵ect of
both spouse’ attitudes on the extensive margin of the wife’s labour market supply. We can
see that the likelihood of the wife entering the labour market is significantly estimated to
increase by 21.6 percentage points in response to a   increase in own attitude (s.e.=4.6),
and by 32% in response to a   increase in her partner’s attitude (s.e.=5.8).25
In the remaining columns, the threshold values of q are chosen in order to break
24These are estimates of the causal e↵ect of female attitudes for females whose attitudes were influenced
by whether their mothers worked when they were aged 14.
25The result found here that the impact of the husband’s attitude is about 10 percentage points higher
than that of his wife’s, on the extensive margin of her labour market supply, departs from from that
obtained by Farre´ and Vella (2009) for the US context. There they find no substantial di↵erence between
these two e↵ects, both fluctuating around the e↵ect I find here for the wife’s attitude.
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down the sample distribution of the intrahousehold specialisation measure, s, across its
four quartiles. That is, Columns 3, 4, and 5, focus on the likelihood that s is above
its 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. Overall, the results suggest that the
total causal e↵ect both spouses’ attitudes are not limited to the extensive margin of the
wife’s labour market supply. They appear to be persistent across the entire distribution
of intrahousehold specialisation.
1.4.3 The Assortative Matching Channel
My next task is to understand the extent to which these total causal e↵ects are being
channeled through the respondents’ choices of spouses with gender-role attitudes similar
to their own. In order to isolate the direct component of those e↵ects, that is the part
that takes place over and above the one that occurs through positive assortative matching
on attitudes in the marriage market, I use a multiple IV strategy. Specifically, I employ a
2SLS procedure, whose second-stage equation is given by
si =  
0wi +  1a1i +  2a2i + µi, (1.20)
where si is defined as before; and wi now includes the previous vector of control variables
but for both spouses. The parameters of interest are  1 and  2, where  1 captures the
(direct) causal e↵ect of the wife’s attitude a1i conditional on her husband’s attitude, and
 2 captures the (direct) causal e↵ect of the husband’s attitude a2i conditional on his wife’s
attitude.
The two first-stages of this new 2SLS procedure are given by
a1i = ⇠
0wi + ⇡1z1i + ⇡2z2i +  i (1.21a)
a2i = ⇣
0wi +  1z1i +  2z2i + ⌫i (1.21b)
where z1i and z2i are, respectively, dummies capturing the wife’s and the husband’s mother
work status when they were aged 14.26 Estimates of ⇡1, ⇡2,  1, and  2, are reported in
26Observe that if sorting on attitudes was perfectly positive assortative then partners’ attitudes in the
second-stage regression would be perfectly multicolinear, and as a result the second-stage regression could
not be estimated. Also, if sorting on family experiences is very strong our instruments will be highly
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Panel C of Table 1.2. The two instruments are positively and significantly correlated
with both partners’ attitudes. That an individual’s attitude is correlated with her or his
partner’s instrument is a symptom of positive assortative matching on attitudes.27 The
instruments, both in isolation and jointly, appear to be su ciently strong as suggested
by the Angrist-Psichke and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics, respectively, reported at the
bottom of the table.
The 2SLS results are reported in Panel C of Table 1.3. Column 1 shows that when
controlling for both spouses’ attitudes, the previously estimated coe cients measuring the
average total e↵ects of the attitudes of each spouse, reported in Panels A and B, decrease
and become statistically insignificant. This result seems to provide some initial support
to the conjecture that part of those raw e↵ects are intermediated by positive assortative
matching on gender-role attitudes. The remaining columns, however, provide the strongest
piece of evidence that this conjecture indeed seems to hold. We can see that the extensive
margin of the wive’s labour market supply is entirely driven by their husbands’ attitudes.
However, as we look at the impacts across more egalitarian patterns of intrahousehold
time allocations, the impact of the wife’s attitude increasingly gains dominance over that
of her partner. Indeed, on the likelihood that her own share of market work is above 75%
of the couples, is entirely driven by her attitude.
1.4.4 Robustness
Dealing with Censoring
The accuracy of our main results can be criticized on the basis that the linear models from
which they were obtained are inappropriate given the censoring nature of the distribution
of intrahousehold specialisation, our main outcome (but see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pg.
75). However, as we now show, the essence of our results is unchanged when we employ the
censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV) procedure developed by Chernozhukov,
Kowalski and Ferna´ndez-Val (2011), which is specifically tailored to deal simultaneously
with censoring and endogeneity.
correlated and as a result they would be weak.
27In fact if we regress each partner’s attitude on both instruments plus the partner’s attitude, this
“cross”-correlation between an individual’s attitude and his or her partner’s instrument vanishes.
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As before, we first use this alternative econometrics framework to estimate the total
e↵ect of female attitudes, to then confront them with those obtained conditional on her
partner’s attitudes. Specifically, the first set of results are obtained from the following
model
Q⌧ (yi|xi, a1i) = max{0,↵0⌧xi +  ⌧a1i + ⇢⌧⌘i}, (1.22)
where ⌘i is replaced by the residuals of the following regression
a1i =  
0xi + ⇡z1i + ⌘i, (1.23)
and all the remaining variables and parameters are the same as before.28 The second set
of CQIV estimates, i.e. those pertaining to the causal e↵ect of female attitudes over and
above positive assortative matching are obtained from the following extension of (1.22)
Q⌧ (yi|xi, a1i, a2i) = max{0, 0⌧wi +  1⌧a1i +  2⌧a2i + ⇢0⌧⌘i}, (1.24)
where now ⌘i = ( i ⌫i)0 is replaced by the residuals of the following regressions
a1i = ⇠
0wi + ⇡1z1i + ⇡2z2i +  i (1.25a)
a2i = ⇣
0wi +  1z1i +  2z2i + ⌫i, (1.25b)
and all the remaining variables and parameters are the same as in Section 1.4.3.
The results for the first and second set of estimates are reported in panels A and B,
respectively, of Table 1.4. It shows estimates at the mean and at the bottom and top
quartiles of the intrahousehold specialization distribution. Consistent with our previous
findings, we can see that the total causal e↵ect of female attitudes is solely driven by
the fact that more progressive females are matched with more progressive males. This
result appears to be mostly concentrated on the lower part of the distribution, which is
in line with the theoretical prediction that females therein strategically develop a hor-
28Observe that in contrast to the 2SLS procedure, the CQIV method follows a “control function” ap-
proach. Yet their key identification assumptions are similar in spirit. By controlling for ⌘i in the censored
quantile regression (1.22), the CQIV isolates the part of the variation in attitudes that is exogeneously
driven by the instruments.
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izontal matching preference for same-attitude partners to compensate for their reduced
intrahousehold bargaining power.
Alternative Instruments
As explained in Section 1.4.1, mother’s labour supply may a↵ect current intrahousehold
time allocations through channels other than the formation of gender role attitudes. For
that reason, I have controlled for a number of covariates that can be expected to capture
these additional channels: the socio-economic status of the respondent’s father, the type of
school he or she attended, and the age he or she left school. In this section, I examine how
the results change when I use an alternative instrumental variable for gender-role attitudes.
This alternative instrument is an index formed from answers to di↵erent questions in the
survey that try to elicit respondents’ attitudes towards homophobic and family values.29
The analysis follows the same structure as before. First, I estimate the total causal
e↵ect of both women’s and men’s gender-role attitudes on the degree of specialization
within their households, i.e. without controlling for their partners’ attitudes. I then control
for their partners’ attitudes and see how those initial coe cients change. The first and
second stage results are reported in the Appendix Tables 1.A3 and 1.A4, respectively. As
expected, the first-stage results shows that gender-role attitudes, the endogenous variables,
are highly correlated with attitudes towards family values, the instruments. Now, however,
the second-stage results are not consistent with my earlier findings. Specifically, we see
that the coe cients on each partner’s gender-role attitudes always have a significant and
substantial impact independently of whether the other partner’s gender-role attitude is
kept constant.
How to interpret this? One hypothesis is that the theoretical model developed in
Section 1.2 is not consistent with the data. Another hypothesis is that these alternative
29These questions ask the respondent’s degree with the following six statements: (i) “homosexual re-
lationships are wrong”, (ii) “cohabiting is alright”, (iii) “divorce better than unhappy marriage”, (iv)
“parents ought to stay together for children”, (v) “marital status is irrelevant to children”, and (vi) ho-
mosexual relationships are wrong”. Possible answers were: “strongly agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor
disagree”, “disagree”, and “strongly disagree”. I constructed an index capturing the common variation in
the answers to these questions using the Item Response Theory framework utilized to construct the index
of gender-role attitudes (explained in in Appendix 1.A). These questions were first asked in the eighth
wave of the BHPS, and in alternate years to the questions eliciting gender-roles attitudes. As a result,
for given year in our sample we use the respondents’ answers to these questions that were given in the
previous year, when available.
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instruments are not appropriate. Indeed, one can make the case that it is harder for this
alternative instrumental variable to pass the exclusion restriction assumption. This is
because gender-role attitudes are likely not developed in isolation from views about homo-
phobic and family values, but rather they are likely closely intertwined and stem from a
common broad-based belief system. That is, this instrument may be measuring essentially
almost the same thing as the endogenous variable itself. As a result, all the endogeneity
concerns related to gender-role attitudes also hold for this alternative instrument.30
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has argued, theoretically and empirically, that an important component of the
woman’s overall labour market participation strategy is the choice of her partner’s culture.
The key insight is that a woman with greater career aspirations chooses to match with a
more progressive man in order to overcome possible conflict within the household on time
allocation decisions. This in turn explains the observed pattern of positive assortative
matching on gender-role attitudes in the marriage market.
On a more general level, my analysis emphasis the importance that the reduction
of search frictions in the marriage market may have in the prevention of intrahousehold
conflict, when prospective partners have heterogeneous preferences over future marital
outcomes. In a perfectly competitive marriage market, spouses would be perfect assorta-
tively matched with respect to their preferences, and as a result they would decide and
behave according to the standard unitary model where partners share the same preferences
over intrahousehold economic outcomes.
My model assumes non-transferable utility, implying that there is no marriage market
price. An alternative modeling strategy could be to explicitly allow for transfers within
the household. In such setting, given their types, partners would jointly choose their time
allocations, which would in turn determine the match surplus in utility terms. While
in the marriage market, agents would then chose with which type to match with based
on the match surplus when there are transfers that are agreed upon. In this alternative
30In fact, the results obtained with these alternative instruments are very similar to the ones obtained
without instrumenting gender-role attitudes.
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setting, the sharing rule would be also endogenously determined but now as a transfer
that clears the marriage market. An interesting research strategy within this setup would
be to devise an empirical framework that would allow identification and estimation of
preferences towards gender roles based on observed intrahousehold time-allocations.
1.A Appendix: Estimation of Latent Gender-Role Attitudes
This section briefly describes the Item Response Theory method used to estimate latent
gender role attitudes using the observed responses to the six attitudinal statements pre-
sented in Table 1.A1 and Figures 1.A2 and 1.A3. The starting point of this method, is
the intuitive and plausible assumption that more progressive respondents are more likely
to give more progressive responses. Formally, this can be stated as follows. Let ✓ denote
an individual’s underlying latent attitude, where higher values capture more progressive
views about gender roles, and consider two individuals i and j such that ✓j > ✓i. Then,
letting rk 2 {1, ..., 5} denote a possible response to a particular statement k = {1, ..., 6},
this assumption says that p(r  z|✓j)  p(r  z|✓i) with z 2 {1, ..., 5}.
Now, assuming independence of the responses to the di↵erent statements conditional
on ✓, we have that the probability of the joint response r = (r1, ..., r6) is given by p(r) =R Q6
k=1 pk(rk|✓)f(✓)d✓. From this, we can use Bayes’ Theorem to infer the posterior
distribution of attitudes conditional on the observed responses, f(✓|r) = f(✓, r)/p(r) =
p(r|✓)f(✓)/p(r). Setting f(✓) to follow a N(0, 1) distribution, this posterior object is
then estimated with a Sieve Maximum Likelihood procedure (as derived in Spady, 2010).
Finally, taking the average value of this estimated distribution for each individual in the
data we obtain the attitude measure that is used throughout the paper, and whose density
conditional on gender is graphed in Figure 1.A4.
1.B Appendix: Descriptive Regression Analysis
This section performs a descriptive estimation analysis of the relation between di↵erent
measures of time use within household i surveyed in year t, denoted by yit, and the attitude
of the female in that household, a1it. Specifically, we report estimates of variants of the
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following equation
yit =  
0xit +  a1it + "it (1.26)
where vector xit contains partners ages and cohort dummies. The parameter of interest
is  , which depending on the dependent variable used, captures the correlation between
female attitudes and a particular intrahousehold time-use variable.
Appendix Table 1.A2 report the results. Panel A shows estimates obtained from pooled
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) applied to Eq.(1.26), thus capturing the overall sample
correlation between female attitudes and intrahousehold time allocations. Standard errors
in this panel are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Panels B and C
break down this overall correlation into its cross-sectional and longitudinal dimensions.
Specifically, Panels B and C report estimates obtained from a between e↵ects model and
a fixed e↵ects model, respectively, applied to Eq.(1.26).
Female attitudes are significantly correlated with their own allocation of time, posi-
tively so to the market sector and negatively so to the domestic sector. The magnitude
of these correlations is substantial. In contrast, there is very little evidence of a substan-
tial correlation between females’ attitudes and their partners’ time allocations. Finally,
but not surprisingly, given that most of the sample variation in attitudes is driven by
cross-sectional heterogeneity, as shown in Columns 3 and 6, the overall pattern of corre-
lation between attitudes and intrahousehold time allocations is also mostly driven by its
cross-sectional dimension. A finding that justifies the use of cross-sectional approaches in
Section 1.4.
The results obtained from this descriptive analysis are virtually identical if instead
of conditioning on the attitude of the female we condition on her partner’s attitude (not
shown).
1.C Appendix: Tables and Figures
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Table 1.1: Intrahousehold time allocations (hours/week)
Wives Husbands Total (household) Wives’ shares
Mean
(1)
SD
(2)
BV (%)
(3)
Mean
(4)
SD
(5)
BV (%)
(6)
Mean
(7)
SD
(8)
BV (%)
(9)
Mean
(10)
SD
(11)
BV (%)
(12)
Market work* 23.97 14.50 .656 38.09 6.53 .622 62.06 16.01 .721 .350 .197 .712
Domestic work 15.95 9.68 .672 5.03 4.52 .635 20.98 10.38 .664 .739 .197 .714
Total 39.92 13.28 .647 43.11 7.67 .638 83.04 15.89 .659 .471 .113 .636
Market Share .546 .306 .723 .879 .131 .607 .742 .129 .702
Notes: Data pooling waves 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 12 of the BHPS. All sample members for whom data on the partner is also available in any wave, totaling 12,381 observations. 
Number of observations is 13,183. *Fraction of wives that participate in the labour market is 0.823 (s.d.=0.381). The coefficient of between variation in Columns 3, 6, 9, and 12, for 
each variable is the sum of squares of differences between individual means and the whole-sample mean, divided by the sum over all individuals and years of the square of the 
difference between each observation and the mean. P-values on the mean differences between spouses’ time allocated to both activities not reported but all equal 0.000.
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Table 1.2: First-stage estimates
Dependent variable: Wife’s attitude Husband’s attitude
(1) (2)
A. First-stage for the total effect of the wife’s attitudes
Wife’s mother worked when she was 14 .165***
(.018)
-
A-P F test 87.09 -
B. First-stage for the total effect of the husband’s attitudes
Husband’s mother worked when he was 14 - .125***
(.017)
A-P F test - 78.95
C. First-stage for the partial effects of both spouses’ attitudes
Wife’s mother worked when she was 14 .163***
(.018)
.099***
(.018)
Husband’s mother worked when he was 14 .094***
(.019)
.121***
(.018)
A-P F test 13.25 12.02
K-P W F test 9.05
S-Y weak id 10% critical value 7.03
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 12,381 observations in all regressions. Standard 
errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. The A-P F statistic is the weak 
identification Angrist-Pischke F statistic. The K-P F statistic is the weak identification Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
F statistic. The three regressions control for both spouses’ ages and cohort dummies. On top of these basic 
controls, the regression in Panel A also controls for the wife’s father socio-economic status, the type of school 
she attended, and the age at which she left school; the regression in Panel B does the same but for the 
husband; the regression in Panel C does the same for both spouses.
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Table 1.3: 2SLS estimates
Dependent variable smf 1[smf > 0] 1[smf > .5] 1[smf > .75] 1[smf > .9]
Mean .625 .823 .703 .460 .243
(5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Total effect of women’s attitudes
Woman’s attitude .260***
(.043)
.216***
(.046)
.258***
(.055)
.328***
(.061)
.248***
(.050)
Panel B: Total effect of men’s attitudes
Man’s attitude .263***
(.053)
.320***
(.058)
.293***
(.066)
.270***
(.069)
.165***
(.057)
Panel C:  Partial effects of spousal attitudes
Woman’s attitude .092
(.101)
.026
(.110)
.132
(.131)
.330**
(.148)
.293**
(.130)
Man’s attitude .257***
(.100)
.312***
(.147)
.222
(.157)
.021
(.124)
-.050
(.132)
Notes: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 12,381 observations in all regressions. The 
underlying dependent variable, smf, is the female’s own share of market work divided by her partner’s own share of 
market work.  Standard errors robust to arbirtraty heteroskedasticity and arbirtrary autocorrelation. All regressions 
control for partners’ ages, cohort dummies, each partner’s father socio-economic status, type of school attended by 
each partner, and the age at which each partner left school. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.4: Censored quantile IV estimates
Quantile: .25 .5 .75
(1) (2) (3)
Sample quantile .425 .719 .896
Panel A: Total effect of female attitudes
Female’s attitude .481***
(.088)
.251***
(.045)
.141***
(.028)
Observations 12,381
Panel B: Partial effects
Female’s attitude -.023
(.398)
.050
(.216)
.044
(.095)
Partner’s attitude .512***
(.171)
.253
(.432)
.134
(.111)
Observations 12,381
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. The dependent variable is 
the female’s own share of market work divided by her partner’s share of market work. Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are bootstrapped using 200 replications.
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Table 1.A1: Self-reported attitudes
Wives Husbands Difference Correlation
Mean SD BV (%) Mean SD BV (%) p-value OLS estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Husband should earn, wife stay at home 3.887 .962 .704 3.665 .977 .685 [.000] .275***
(.009)
Pre-school child suffers if mother works 3.186 1.060 .700 2.901 1.037 .670 [.000] .341***
(.008)
Family suffers if mother works full-time 3.221 1.105 .712 3.134 1.047 .678 [.000] .325***
(.009)
Woman and family happier if she works 2.886 .750 .570 2.855 .757 .546 [.000] .129***
(.009)
Husband and wife should both contribute 3.510 .909 .649 3.461 .898 .614 [.000] .218***
(.009)
Full time job makes woman independent 3.082 .988 .637 3.157 .913 .595 [.000] .192***
(.010)
Attitude (Estimated index) .087 1.564 .768 .0093 1.543 .730 [.177] .404***
(.008)
Notes: Possible answers to all statements were 1 “strongly agree”, 2 “agree”, 3 “neither agree nor disagree”, 4 “disagree”, and 5 “strongly disagree”. Answers to the first three 
statements were reversed such that higher answers to every question indicate less traditional views about gender roles. The Cronbach alpha statistic 0.7068 for females and 
0.6910 for males. The attitude index is the estimated latent obtained from the IRT procedure.  The coefficient of between variation BV in Columns 3 and 6 for each variable is the 
sum of squares of differences between individual means and the whole-sample mean, divided by the sum over all individuals and years of the square of the difference between 
each observation and the mean. The pairwise correlation measures reported in Column 8 are obtained from OLS regressions of the female’s answers to each question against 
those of her partner, and the corresponding standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary auto-correlation.
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Table 1.A2: Descriptive regression estimates on intrahousehold time allocations
Wife’s Time Use Husband’s Time Use
Intrahousehold 
Specialization
Dependent variable
Works 
in the market 
[=1 if yes]
(%)
Market time
(hours/week)
Domestic time
(hours/week)
Market share
[=(2)/[(2)+(3)]]
(%)
Market time
(hours/week)
Domestic time
(hours/week)
Market share
[=(5)/[(5)+(6)]]
(%)
Female relative 
market specialization
[=(4)/(7)]
(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample mean 
[standard deviation]
.823
[.381]
24.043
[14.493]
15.952
[9.666]
.547
[.306]
38.667
[4.653]
5.027
[4.505]
.891
[.086]
.626
[.363]
Panel A: Pooled OLS
Wife’s Attitude .089***
(.003)
4.315***
(.122)
-1.885***
(.084)
.087***
(.003)
-.054
(.042)
.412***
(.040)
-.008***
(.001)
.110***
(.003)
R-squared .0645 .0921 .0758 .0900 .0065 .0171 .0173 .0898
Panel B: Between Effects
Wife’s Attitude .101***
(.006)
4.797***
(.216)
-2.152***
(.140)
.100***
(.005)
-.062
(.078)
.470***
(.067)
-.009***
(.001)
.125***
(.006)
“Between” R-squared .0745 .1114 .1193 .1149 .0131 .0190 .0167 .1142
Panel C: Fixed Effects
Wife’s Attitude .041***
(.005)
1.415***
(.159)
-.527***
(.118)
.032***
(.003)
-.024
(.056)
.063
(.057)
-.002*
(.001)
.037***
(.004)
“Within” R-squared .0113 .0103 .0046 .0109 .0028 .0018 .0026 .0100
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Each column corresponds to one regression. Number of observations in all regressions is 12,381. All regressions control for 
spousal ages and cohort dummies. Standard errors reported in parentheses. In panel A, standard errors are adjusted for household clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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Table 1.A3: First-stage estimates with alternative instruments
Dependent variable: Wife’s attitude Husband’s attitude
(1) (2)
A. First-stage for the total effect of the wife’s attitudes
Wife’s family values .306***!
(.007)
-
A-P F test 2051.86 -
B. First-stage for the total effect of the husband’s attitudes
Husband’s family values - .326***!
(.014)
A-P F test - 524.50
C. First-stage for the partial effects of both spouses’ attitudes
Wife’s family values .286***!
(.009)
.059**!
(.012)
Husband’s family values .033*!
(.012)
.293***!
(.018)
A-P F test 758.40 234.33
K-P W F test 396.06
S-Y weak id 10% critical value 7.03
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 5,686 observations in all regressions. Standard 
errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. The A-P F statistic is the weak 
identification Angrist-Pischke F statistic. The K-P F statistic is the weak identification Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
F statistic. The three regressions control for both spouses’ ages and cohort dummies. On top of these basic 
controls, the regression in Panel A also controls for the wife’s father socio-economic status, the type of school 
she attended, and the age at which she left school; the regression in Panel B does the same but for the 
husband; the regression in Panel C does the same for both spouses.!
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Table 1.A4: 2SLS estimates with alternative instruments
Dependent variable smf 1[smf > 0] 1[smf > .5] 1[smf > .75] 1[smf > .9]
Mean .625 .823 .703 .460 .243
(5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Total effect of women’s attitudes
Woman’s attitude .133***!
(.009)
.087***!
(.007)
.143***!
(.023)
.142***!
(.008)
.128***!
(.011)
Panel B: Total effect of men’s attitudes
Man’s attitude .132***!
(.005)
.099***!
(.010)
.126***!
(.013)
.149***!
(.011)
.127***!
(.007)
Panel C:  Partial effects of spousal attitudes
Woman’s attitude .084***!
(.009)
.051***!
(.010)
.098***!
(.024)
.084***!
(.006)
.072***!
(.024)
Man’s attitude .080***!
(.006)
.060***!
(.011)
.066***!
(.005)
.099***!
(.016)
.090***!
(.016)
Notes: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 5,686 observations in all regressions. Standard 
errors robust to arbirtraty heteroskedasticity and arbirtrary autocorrelation. All regressions control for partners’ ages, 
cohort dummies, each partner’s father socio-economic status, type of school attended by each partner, and the age at 
which each partner left school. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1.3: Women’s acceptance sets
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Figure 1.4: Men’s acceptance sets
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Figure 1.5: Matching sets
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of intrahousehold specialization
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Figure 1.7: Intrahousehold specialization and women’s gender-role attitudes
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Figure 1.8: Intrahousehold specialization and men’s gender-role attitudes
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Figure 1.9: Positive assortative matching on gender-role attitudes
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Figure 1.A2: Histograms of wives’ self reported attitudes
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Figure 1.A3: Histograms of husbands’ self reported attitudes
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Figure 1.A5: Women’s gender role attitudes by birth cohorts
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2
Health Education and Microfinance:
Complements or Substitutes in Reducing
Neonatal Mortality?
2.1 Introduction
Multiple NGO interventions, o↵ering di↵erent development services, coexist in space and
time. Yet little is known about whether spillover e↵ects across them exist. Using longi-
tudinal data from a randomised health education intervention in rural India, stratified by
the presence of a pre-existing microfinance intervention, this paper finds a significant and
substantial negative interaction between the e↵ects of these two interventions in reducing
neonatal mortality. Both are found to be more e↵ective when o↵ered in isolation than
when o↵ered together. This finding is surprising given popular claims that health educa-
tion and microfinance complement each other. It is also an important finding for policy
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makers and donors alike who wish to maximize the e↵ectiveness of their development
strategies in a world of tough budgetary decisions.
In theory, health education is expected to relax knowledge constraints on the mapping
from health behaviours into health outcomes (Grossman, 1972; Kenkel, 1991). Microfi-
nance, in turn, is expected to relax financial constraints that limit an individual’s ability to
invest in healthy behaviours (Banerjee et al., 2010). The rationale that is typically o↵ered
for a possible complementarity between these two inputs for improving health outcomes
is as follows. The increased income provided by microfinance is expected to increase the
individuals’ ability to act on new health knowledge. Conversely, new health knowledge
is expected to improve the individuals’ ability to more e↵ectively allocate the additional
income obtained from microfinance to health care expenditures.
Crucial to this complementarity argument is the assumption that the health behaviours
outside the individuals’ information sets, over which health education sheds light, are more
costly than those that are already well known to them. If the opposite holds, however, then
health education and microfinance should be expected to substitute each other. This is
because in such case, financial constraints increases the value of knowledge about alterna-
tive and more a↵ordable health behaviours; and, conversely, lack of knowledge about these
alternative behaviours raises the need for the relaxation of financial constraints in order to
invest in known, yet costlier, health behaviours. This alternative hypothesis has seldom
been put forward both by researchers and development practitioners. This is surprising
given that many health education interventions in developing countries aim at dissemi-
nating knowledge on simple and a↵ordable health behaviours amongst their financially
constrained populations.
In this paper we provide evidence in favour of this alternative hypothesis by exploit-
ing longitudinal data from the Ekjut cluster-randomized control trial.1 This intervention
formed groups of women in remote villages located in a rural part of India, aimed at
increasing awareness on the causes of neonatal mortality in the community, as well as
on a↵ordable preventive health behaviours to tackle such causes. The randomised place-
ment of these groups across di↵erent communities was stratified by the presence of a
1The Ekjut trial has been recognised as Trial of of the Year by the Society for Clinical Trials.
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pre-existing microfinance intervention. Specifically, in communities where microfinance
was not in place the Ekjut implemented new groups of women, whereas in communities
where microfinance was in place, it piggy-backed on the pre-existing self-help groups of
women involved in credit and savings activities. This design feature, together with the
longituindal dimension of our dataset, provides a particularly suitable econometric plat-
form for the analysis of whether health education and microfinance act as substitutes or
complements in reducing neonatal mortality.
Our central finding, under weak identifying assumption, is that the health education
intervention and the microfinance intervention substituted each other in reducing neonatal
mortality. When o↵ered in isolation, both led to a strong reduction in neonatal mortality;
but when o↵ered together, their joint e↵ect was smaller than the sum of their individ-
ual e↵ects. That is, the presence of one of the interventions caused a reduction in the
e↵ectiveness of the other.
Additional analysis on the mechanisms through which these two interventions acted
sheds further light on this negative interaction e↵ect between the two interventions. Con-
firming earlier results by Tripathy et al. (2010), we find that the health education interven-
tion when o↵ered alone led to an increase in the adoption of a↵ordable hygienic behaviours
during home deliveries. Though more di cult to pin down the exact channels through
which the microfinance intervention reduced neonatal mortality, the data suggests that
it did so by increasing payments made to traditional birth attendants. These channeling
e↵ects of both interventions when o↵ered alone are substantially weakened when they were
jointly o↵ered.
These additional findings suggest that (i) in communities not receiving the health
education intervention, informational constraints on alternative self-help preventive be-
haviours during home deliveries raised the need for the relaxation of financial constraints
in order to attract the most successful and experienced birth attendants, thus making
the microfinance intervention more potent there; and (ii) in communities not receiving
the microfiance intervention, financial constraints raised the need for knowledge on those
behaviours in order to compensate for the households’ inability to match with the most
valued birth attendants, thus making the health education intervention more potent there.
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Two earlier studies that have tested for spillover e↵ects between health education
and microfinance are worth mentioning. First, Smith (2002) compares an intervention
that bundled credit and health education with an intervention that only o↵ered credit to
its clients using a non-experimental dataset in urban Honduras and rural Ecuador. His
results are mixed. For the Honduras subsample he finds that only the integrated package
significantly reduced childhood diarrhoea probability. The opposite result however was
found for the Ecuador subsample, where only the credit-only intervention was found to
significantly reduce diarrhoea incidence.
Second, Hamad, Fernald and Karlan (2011) evaluate the impact of a randomized health
information intervention on a sample of microcredit clients in Peru. The authors do not
find evidence of complementarities nor substituabilities between microfinance and health
education on child health. A drawback of their study is that it lacks the appropriate
counterfactual, which would consist of a parallel experiment on a sample of non-microcredit
clients. In this respect, an advantage of our study is that the health intervention analysed
has been randomly assigned both to a sample of communities involved in microfinance
activities and to a sample of communities not involved in microfinance activities. Our
study further di↵ers from these two earlier studies in the sense that we focus on the
e↵ects that the interaction of health and the microfinance interventions can have at the
community level, not at the individual level. That is, we focus on intention-to-treat e↵ects.
These are the parameters of interest in our case due to the community-based nature of
the health intervention that we analyse.
More generally, this paper can be placed within the growing trend of research that
analyses interactions across di↵erent development ingredients as well as di↵erent develop-
ment interventions. Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2011) show that providing HIV informa-
tion to teenage girls in Kenya has stronger e↵ects on sexually transmitted infections, but
weaker e↵ect on early fertility, when accompanied by education subsidies. Ashraf, Jack
and Kamenica (2013) show that providing additional information about a health prod-
uct in Zambia significantly increases the impact of a price subsidy on purchases of the
product. Bandiera et al. (2010) show that past experience with NGO projects discourages
participation in adolescent training programs in Uganda.
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This paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the research design and the
data set used in this paper. Section 2.3 formally discusses the identification concerns and
strategies used to uncover the triple of causal e↵ects of interest: the independent e↵ect of
the health education intervention, the independent e↵ect of the microfinance intervention,
and the interaction e↵ect between the two interventions. Section 2.4 checks for treatment-
control balance, and identifies observable di↵erences across microfinance strata. Section
2.5 examines participation decisions in the health education intervention, separately across
microfinance strata. Section 2.6 presents the main results, performs a robustness analysis,
and uncovers di↵erential mechanism through which each intervention operated. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Research Design and Data
This paper uses data collected to evaluate the Ekjut cluster-randomised controlled trial in
rural India. This intervention, which began in 2005, randomly implemented 244 women’s
groups in half of 36 clusters located in three contiguous districts of Jharkhand and Orissa:
Seraikela-Karshwan, West Singhbhum, and Keonjhar. Each of these groups, of around 15-
20 women, held a participatory learning and action cycle of 20 monthly meetings. During
these meetings, under the guidance of trained local facilitators, group members diagnosed
the causes underlying maternal and neonatal deaths in their communities, and identified
simple, a↵ordable, and e↵ective health behaviours in order to avoid those deaths.2
The randomised allocation process of the 36 clusters into treatment and control was
stratified according to both their pre-existing assignment to an on-going microfinance
intervention as well as their district location. Table 2.1 reports the distribution of clusters
by their district location and by their assignment statuses to both the health education
and the microfinance interventions. Although by design treatment and control clusters are
balanced with respect to these two dimensions, we can see that a cluster’s district location
is not orthogonal to its assignment to the microfinance intervention. This is not surprising
2These facilitators, though formally not health educators, received basic training to discuss health
problems during pregnancy and childbirth in addition to participatory communication techniques. For a
more detailed discussion on the operations of these groups see Tripathy et al. (2010) and the YouTube
video http://youtu.be/7joI2G67M 0.
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given that the placement of the mircofinance intervention was not itself randomised, and it
readily illustrates the identification problem we will have to deal with. To the extent that
district-specific characteristics can interact with the e↵ectiveness of the Ekjut intervention,
attributing any di↵erence in its e↵ectiveness across microfinance strata to the presence of
microfinance only may be misleading. These and other identification concerns will be
formally discussed in Section 2.3.
In the non-microfinance stratum, the Ekjut implemented new groups of women, whereas
in the microfinance stratum it used the pre-existing self-help groups of women involved in
credit and savings activities. Initially these self-help groups were closed, but with the ad-
dition of the Ekjut cycle of meeting, these groups opened up to new members. Members of
the self-help groups were allowed to stay for the Ekjut meetings, but new Ekjut members
were not given access to the pre-existing microfinance services. One particular concern
that can thus emerge from this design feature, and that we will be addressing, is that
the self-selection mechanism driving individual participation in the Ekjut meetings within
the microfinance stratum may have been di↵erent than that within the non-microfinance
stratum. For example, one may hypothesise that participation within the microfinance
stratum could have been partially driven by the expectation of gaining access to the pre-
existing self-help groups.
In order to collect data to evaluate the e↵ectiveness of the Ekjut intervention, a key
informant surveillance system was implemented during the 3 years of the intervention, as
well as during a 8 month baseline period immediately prior to the start of the intervention.
Key informants, essentially traditional birth attendants and active village members, iden-
tified all births, neonatal and maternal outcomes in the study location. They then met
with interviewers, who in turn verified all births and interviewed all identified mothers at
around 6 weeks after their delivery.3 The interviewer collected detailed information about
the women’s pregnancy, delivery, and post-partum periods up to that period, as well as
about their socio-economic and demographic characteristics.
3These informants did not have incentives for under- or over-reporting these events as they were allo-
cated to familiar and manageable geographical areas (their allocated area corresponded to approximately
250 households), and their payments were only made after the interviewers verified their identified births
and deaths. To minimise errors, all interviewed women were ‘snowballed’ to identify any other women in
the study area who had given birth recently (see Barnett et al. (2008) for a detailed description of this
surveillance methodology).
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We supplemented this dataset with information on village-level amenities from the 2005
Indian census for the districts of Seraikela-Karshwan and West Singhbhum.4 We did this
because we wanted understand the extent to which villages with and without microfinance
di↵ered in ways that could interact with the e↵ectiveness of the health education, and thus
put at risk identification of the interaction causal e↵ect between the two interventions.
2.3 Identification
2.3.1 Triple of Causal E↵ects, and Potential Sources of Bias
We borrow Rubin’s notion of potential outcomes in order to define the causal e↵ects of
interest. Following the time structure of our main source of data, let Y 00ikt, Y
10
ikt, Y
01
ikt, and
Y 11ikt, denote respectively neonatal survival in household i in cluster k at time period t
(where t = 0 for the pre-health education intervention period, and t = 1 for the post-health
education intervention period), across the following four potential scenarios: (i) this cluster
k receives neither intervention, (ii) it receives the health education intervention only, (iii)
it receives the microfinance intervention only, and (iv) it receives both interventions.
We focus on causal e↵ects averaged across births within clusters sharing the same
assignment status with respect to the health education and the microfinance interventions.
That is, on the (the policy-relevant) average intent-to-treat (ITT) e↵ects. Let e be a
dummy indicating the health education treatment group, and m a dummy indicating the
microfinance stratum. Thus, for a given group of clusters, identified by both e and m, at
a given time period t, we can define the triple of causal e↵ects
⌧emt = (↵emt, emt,  emt), (2.1)
where ↵emt = E[Y 10ikt Y 00ikt|e,m, t] is the average ITT independent causal e↵ect of the health
education intervention;  emt = E[Y 01ikt   Y 00ikt|e,m, t] is the average ITT independent causal
e↵ect of the microfinance intervention; and  emt = E[(Y 11ikt Y 10ikt)  (Y 01ikt Y 00ikt)|e,m, t] is the
average ITT interaction causal e↵ect between the two interventions.
4Unfortunately, this census did not have information for most of the villages located in the district of
Keonjhar studied in this paper. As a result, when village level data is used, our analysis is restricted to the
districts of Seraikela-Karshwan and West Singhbhum only. This sample restriction does not raise serious
concerns, apart from potentialy reducing the precision of our estimates, because the randomisation of the
health education was stratified both across district and by the presence of microfinance.
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Realized outcomes, Yikt, can be linked to the the triple of causal e↵ects ⌧emt given
by (2.1). Letting Ekt and Mkt be dummy variables indicating whether cluster k actually
receives the health education intervention and the microfinance intervention, respectively,
at time period t, we can then write
Yikt =  emt + ↵emtEkt +  emtMkt +  emt(Ekt ·Mkt) + "ikt, (2.2)
where  emt = E[Y00ikt|e,m, t] and E["ikt|e,m, t] = 0, which says that in the absence of
both interventions, neonatal mortality is determined by a possibly time-varying cluster
e↵ect. This section will make precise the assumptions required to identify the parameters
of interest. Specifically, it will show that in order to identify the stand-alone impact of
microfinance we will have to assume that  emt equals the sum of a time-invariant di↵erence
between microfinance and non-microfinance strata, and a time e↵ect that is common across
microfinance and non-microfinance clusters. Furthermore, in order to identify the impact
of microfinance on the e↵ectiveness of the health education intervention, we will have to
assume that clusters in the microfinance stratum do not di↵er systematically from those
in the non-microfinance stratum in ways that may drive a wedge in the e↵ectiveness of the
health education intervention. To see this, let us first use Eq.(2.2) to define the parameters
of interest.
Di↵erencing Eq.(2.2) both across e and t, for m = 0, gives
 t eE[Yikt|e,m = 0, t] = ↵101 + t e ( e0t) , (2.3)
where ↵101 is the average independent ITT e↵ect of the health education intervention
among clusters treated by this intervention only; and  t e ( e0t) is a basing term captur-
ing a possible underlying time-varying treatment-control di↵erence in expected neonatal
mortality, within the non-microfinance stratum.
If, instead, Eq.(2.2) is di↵erenced both across m and t, for e = 0, we obtain
 t mE[yikt | e = 0,m, t] =  t ( 011) + t m ( 0m1) , (2.4)
where  t( 011) is the independent ITT causal e↵ect of microfinance, between time periods
t = 0 and t = 1, among clusters receiving microfinance only. We call this e↵ect, the
72
continuation causal e↵ect of microfinance since it nets outs its e↵ect up to t = 0. The
term  t m ( 0m1) captures a potentially biasing underlying di↵erence in average neonatal
mortality between microfinance strata, within the health education control group.
Finally, di↵erencing Eq.(2.2) across e, m, and t, gives
 t m eE[yikt|e,m, t] =  111 + m (↵1m1) + t e ( e11) + t m e ( em1) , (2.5)
where  111 is the average ITT interaction between the health education and microfinance
among clusters that actually host both interventions (the interaction e↵ect on the treated).
There are three possible sources of bias in the triple di↵erence given by Eq.(2.5). First,
 m (↵1m1) captures the possibility that the average independent e↵ectiveness of the health
education intervention at t = 1 may interact with underlying characteristics that are
specific to the microfinance stratum. Second,  t e ( e11) captures the possibility that
the independent ‘continuation’ e↵ectiveness of the microfinance intervention, may inter-
act with time-varying underlying characteristics that are specific to the health education
treatment group. Third,  t m e ( em1) captures a possible time-varying interaction be-
tween underlying characteristics specific to the health education treatment group, on one
hand, and to the microfinance stratum, on the other hand, that can in turn a↵ect expected
neonatal mortality.
2.3.2 How Much Can We Identify?
Stratified randomisation of the health education intervention implies that on average the
only di↵erence between treatment and control groups, within both microfinance strata, is
their assignment statuses to the health education intervention. This has two implications.
First, in the absence of the health education intervention, expected neonatal mortality
should be the same in treatment and control groups, i.e.  e ( emt) = 0. As a result,
the biasing terms  t e ( e0t) and  t m e ( em1) in Eqs. (2.3) and (2.5), respectively,
vanish. Second, in the absence of the health education intervention, the e↵ectiveness of
the microfinance intervention should be the same in treatment and control groups, i.e.
 e ( e1t). As a result, the biasing term  t e ( e11) in Eq.(2.5) vanishes.
It thus follows that the stratified randomized nature of the health education interven-
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tion enables Eq.(2.3) to fully identify the independent causal e↵ect of the health education
intervention, ↵101, and it substantially eases the ability of Eq.(2.5) to identify the interac-
tion causal e↵ect between the health education and the microfinance interventions,  111.
For Eq.(2.5) to fully identify this latter parameter, however, it has to be the case that
 m (↵1m1) = 0.
H 1. It is assumed that  m (↵1m1) = 0, i.e. that in the absence of microfinance, clusters
in the microfinance stratum do not di↵er from those in the non-microfinance stratum in
ways that may drive a wedge in the e↵ectiveness of the health education intervention.
This identification assumption may be unrealistic given the non-random placement of
the microfinance intervention. Indeed, and anticipating on our own analysis, we observe
that villages located in the microfinance stratum are better served by maternal and child
health care centres than villages located in the non-microfinance stratum. If these health
care facilities either complement,  m (↵1m1) > 0, or substitute,  m (↵1m1) < 0, the health
education intervention, then Eq.(2.5) will either over- or under-estimate, respectively, the
true interaction causal e↵ect between heath education and microfinance,  111.
Hence, in the empirical section of this paper we will relax H1, and will proceed as
follows. First, we will identify observable di↵erences in individual, household, and village
level characteristics, between the microfinance stratum and the non-microfinance stra-
tum. Second, when estimating the triple of causal e↵ects ⌧emk, we will control for possible
heterogeneous e↵ects of the health education intervention with respect to these character-
istics. The resulting estimate for the interaction causal e↵ect,  t m eE[yikt|e,m, t], will
thus identify the di↵erential causal e↵ect of the health education intervention between
the microfinance and the non-microfinance strata, over and above its heterogeneous ef-
fectiveness with respect to these characteristics. To the extent that explicitly controlling
for these observable sources of heterogeneity, implicitly controls of unobserved sources of
heterogeneity, this procedure will identify the true interaction causal e↵ect between the
two interventions,  111.
Finally, the longitudinal dimension of our dataset, in turn, implies that any underlying
time-invariant di↵erence in expected realized neonatal mortality between the microfinance
and the non-microfinance stratum can be eliminated. That is, under the assumption that
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there are no time-varying di↵erences in expected neonatal mortality between these two
strata, the biasing term t m ( 0m1) in Eq.(2.4) vanishes, enabling it to identify the causal
e↵ect of the microfinance intervention between t = 0 and t = 1, i.e. its continuation casual
e↵ect  t ( 011).
H 2. It is assumed that  t m ( 0m1) = 0, i.e. that there are no time-varying di↵erences
in expected neonatal mortality between clusters with and without microfinance.
2.4 Balance Checks
In order to gauge the potential sources of bias discussed in the previous section, we now
identify observable di↵erences across the microfinance strata, and assess whether the strat-
ified randomisation of the health education intervention successfully balanced treatment
and control groups. To do so, we estimate regressions of the following form using data
from the baseline period
Xihvk = ↵0 + ↵1Ek + ↵2Mk + ↵3[Ek ⇥Mk] +↵04dk + "ihvk, (2.6)
where Xihvk is a particular observable characteristic, either at the respondent mother level
i, at the level of her household h, or at the level of her village v; Ek is a dummy indicating
whether the cluster k from where this mother comes from is located in the treatment group;
Mk is a dummy indicating whether the cluster is located in the microfinance stratum; and
dk is a vector of dummies indicating the cluster’s district location. Inference is made
robust to heteskodestaticity by clustering the standard errors at the cluster level - the
level at which the randomisation of the health education intervention took place.
For each characteristic on the left-hand side of Eq.(2.6), ↵1, ↵2, and ↵3, measure,
respectively, its expected treatment-control di↵erence in the non-microfinance stratum,
its expected di↵erence across the microfinance strata within the control group, and the
di↵erence in its expected treatment-control di↵erence across microfinance strata.5 Under
the null hypothesis that the stratified randomisation of the health education intervention
5The parameter ↵3 equivalently measures for each characteristic the expected treatment-control di↵er-
ence in its di↵erence across microfinance strata.
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successfully balanced treatment and control groups within both microfinace strata, our
estimates for both ↵1 and ↵3 should not significantly di↵er from zero.6 However, since
the microfinance intervention was not itself randomly placed, there is a priori no reason
to expect  2 to be equal to zero. In order to net out our estimates of  2 from district
specific components that may simultaneously predict the availability of microfinance and
the characteristics measured on the left-hand side of Eq.(2.6), we throughout control for
district fixed e↵ects.
The results are reported in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Table 2.2 focus on the main
outcome of interest, the likelihood of the baby dying within the first six weeks of life,
and on di↵erent care seeking behaviours during pregnancy and hygienic practices at home
deliveries. Table 2.3 focus on individual and household background level characteristics.
Table 2.4 focus on village level characteristics. In each of these three tables, Column 1
shows the means and standard deviations of these variables for the subsample of control
clusters in the non-microfinance stratum. Column 2 reports estimates for ↵1, Column 3
for ↵2, and Column 4 for ↵3. Column 5, in turn, reports the p-value associated with the
F-test for the null hypothesis that the triple (↵1,↵2,↵3) is jointly equal to zero.
Overall it appears that the stratified randomisation of the health education intervention
successfully balanced treatment and control groups, within both microfinance strata. Table
2.2 shows that neonatal mortality at baseline is statistically indistinguishable between
treatment and control clusters. Within the non-microfinance stratum, the likelihood that
a newborn baby dies within the first six weeks of life is 4.5% in control clusters. A figure
that raises by a statistically insignificant 1.7 percentage points (s.e.=1.2) among treated
clusters within that stratum. The hypothesis that this treatment-control balance extends
to the microfinance stratum cannot be rejected. There, the treatment-control di↵erence in
neonatal mortality is a statistically insignificant 1.4 percentage points smaller than that in
the non-microfinance stratum (s.e. = 1.4). The rest of Table 2.2 indicates that this pattern
of balance between treatment and control clusters, within both microfinance strata, cannot
be rejected for di↵erent care-seeking behaviours during pregnancy and hygienic practices
during home deliveries
6Observe that an interesting corollary of the null that ↵3 = 0 is that any di↵erence across microfinace
strata detected in the control group should also be detected in the treatment group (and vice-versa).
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Tables 2.3, and 2.4 provide further evidence suggesting that the randomisation of
the health education intervention has been successful. Column 2 of these tables, shows
that out of 22 treatment-control di↵erences on individual, household, and village level
characteristics, within the non-microfinance stratum, only one - just below 5% of the total
- is statistically significant at the 5% level. Column 4, in turn, shows that this pattern of
balance between treatment and control clusters within the non-microfinance is significantly
indistinguishable from that in the microfinance stratum.
A similar set of comparisons, but now across microfinace strata, tells a di↵erent story.
Although no significant di↵erences across this strata were detected on neonatal mortality
and other health related measures, we do find that mothers coming from the microfinance
stratum appear to be better o↵ than mothers coming from the non-microfinance stratum.
Specifically, Column 3 of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 shows that within the control group of clusters
the presence of microfinance is associated with a 0.26 decrease in the number of times
the respondent mother was pregnant (s.e.=0.15), a 19.4 percentage points increase in
the likelihood that she has a say within her household (s.e.=9.5), a 0.23 increase in the
number of assets held by her household (s.e.=0.14), and a 38 percentage points increase
in the likelihood that her village has a maternal or a child health centre (s.e.=11.7). As a
consequence of the successful randomisation of the health education intervention, Column
4 indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that these di↵erences across microfinance
strata among control clusters extend to the treated clusters.
To the extent that the observed di↵erences across microfinance strata can interact
with the e↵ectiveness of the health education intervention, it will therefore be important
to control for these observable sources of variability in its e↵ectiveness, when estimating
its di↵erential causal e↵ect across microfinance strata in Section 2.6. Doing this will help
us isolate the part of that overall di↵erential e↵ectiveness that is only due to the presence
of the microfinance intervention.
2.5 Participation
This subsection examines whether participation rates in the Ekjut intervention, as well
as observable individual determinants of participation, vary across microfinance strata.
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Whether the presence of microfinance increases or reduces the overall participation rate
in the Ekjut intervention, depends on whether microfinance and health education com-
plement or substitute each other. If the relaxation of financial constraints induced by the
microfinance intervention raised the need for health education, we should then expect it
to have increased. Under the alternative substitutability hypothesis, we should expect it
to have reduced.
The presence of microfinance may have also a↵ected the composition of the participants
in the Ekjut intervention. A particular concern here is the possibility that participation
within the microfinance stratum may have been partially driven by the expectation of
gaining future access to the pre-existing self-help groups involved in credit and savings
activities. If this was the case, it is then possible that the health education groups in
these communities failed to attract the mothers who could have benefited the most from
it, leading to a reduction in its e↵ectiveness.
To shed light on these questions, we estimate versions of the following specification
with a linear probability model, using data from the intervention period in the treated
clusters,
Pihk =  0 +  1Mk +  
0
2Xih ++ 
0
3[Mk ⇥Xih] +  04dk + "ihk (2.7)
where Pihk is a dummy equal to one if the respondent mother i participates in the health
education intervention, Xih is a vector of characteristics of this respondent and of her
household h, Mk is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if cluster k is located in the
microfinance stratum, and dk is a vector of district dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the cluster level.
In order to examine whether aggregate participation rate in the Ekjut intervention
varies with the presence of the microfinance intervention, we start by assuming that the
pattern of individual correlates of participation is homogenous across the microfinance
strata. That is, we restrict the vector of parameters  3 in Eq.(2.7) to be equal to zero.
Our estimate of  1 will thus measure the di↵erence across microfinace strata in average
participation rates in the Ekjut intervention, controlling for both individual and household
level characteristics, as well as for district fixed e↵ects. In addition, our estimates for the
vector  2 will measure the average individual level determinants of participation control-
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ling for both the presence of microfinance in the community and district fixed e↵ects.
The results, reported in Column 1 of Table 2.5, show that the presence of microfinance
reduces average participation rates in the health education intervention. Specifically, a
mother coming from a microfinance cluster is on average 10.9 percentage points (s.e.=5.7)
less likely to participate compared to a mother residing in a cluster without microfinace.
Though statistically significant only at the 10% level, the magnitude of this e↵ect is
substantial once compared against the average participation rate of 37%. This finding
is consistent with the idea that the presence of the microfinace intervention reduced the
demand for the health education intervention, favouring the hypothesis that these two
interventions may have substituted each other.
Column 1 also shows that on average the only significant individual level predictors
of participation are the respondent’s number of past pregnancies and her literacy level.
Specifically, one additional past pregnancy episode is associated with an increase in the
likelihood of participating in a health education group by 5.2 percentages points (s.e.=1.0),
and being able to read and write also increases this probability by 3 percentage points
(s.e.=1.4). These two pieces of evidence seem to suggest that greater awareness of possible
health complications during pregnancy increased the demand for health education.
In order to understand whether the presence of microfinace also a↵ected the compo-
sition of the participants in the Ekjut intervention, we now drop the previous restriction
that  3 = 0 in Eq.(2.7). Now the parameters of interest are the vector  2, which measures
the correlates of participation within the non-microfinance stratum, the vector  2 +  3,
which measures the correlates of participation within the microfinance stratum, and the
vector  3, which measures the di↵erential pattern of correlates of participation between
clusters with and without microfinance. Under the null hypothesis that the presence of
microfinance did not a↵ect who decide attends the health education groups, our estimates
of  3 should not significantly di↵er from zero.
The results are reported in Columns 2-4 of Table 2.5. We can see that the revi-
ously identified significant predictors of participation on average, namely the number of
past pregnancies and whether the respondent is literate, appear to be homogenous across
microfinance strata. This finding supports the idea that microfinance does not appear
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to have fundamentally changed the self-selection mechanism driving participation in the
Ekjut intervention. However we can also see that household asset ownership is a signif-
icant negative predictor of participation, but only within the non-microfinance stratum.
Specifically, there a one standard deviation increase in the household asset index is associ-
ated with a 2.6 percentage points (s.e.=0.7) decrease in participation. In the microfinance
stratum, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that household asset ownership is not
significantly correlated with participation. This di↵erential pattern across microfianance
is statistically significant at 5% level, as indicated by its p-value reported in Column 4.
Based on the literature suggesting that the poorest women are likely to be excluded
from microfinance due to their increased risk of default (see e.g. Armendariz and Morduch,
2010), this finding goes against the idea that the presence of microfinance made partici-
pation in the Ekjut intervention to be partially driven by the expectation of future access
to the pre-existing self-help groups involved in credit and savings activities. How then can
we interpret this finding and how it may a↵ect the e↵ectiveness of the health education
intervention?
One plausible interpretation is that wealthier women that were already participating
in those self-help groups may have decided to stay for the health education sessions. In
such case, whether this will enhance or reduce the e↵ectiveness of the Ekjut intervention
will again depend on whether microfinance and health education are complements or
substitutes. If these women, who are relatively less financially constrained, are in better
position to act on the information gleaned through the health education sessions, then we
should expect this to increase the e↵ectiveness of the Ekjut intervention. If, alternatively,
this relaxation of financial constraints reduced the need for health education, we should
then expect this to further contribute to a reduction in the e↵ectiveness of the Ekjut
intervention.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main Estimates
Equation (2.2) in Section 2.3, which related realized outcomes and the triple of causal
e↵ects of interest, is estimated using the following linear probability model
Yikt =  0+ 1Ek+ 2Mk+ 3(Ek ·Mk)+ 4Tt+ 5(Tt ·Ek)+ 6(Tt ·Mk)+ 7(Tt ·Ek ·Mk)+"ikt, (2.8)
where i indexes births, k clusters, and t time periods; Yikt is a dummy that is equal to
one if the newborn baby i died in the first six weeks of life, and zero otherwise; Ek is a
dummy for clusters assigned to health education; Mk is a dummy for clusters assigned to
microfinance; and Tt is a dummy for the post health education intervention period.
The parameters of interest are  5,  6, and  7, which under the assumption (soon to
be relaxed) that E["ikt|Ek,Mk, tt] = 0, they are respectively equal to the average ITT in-
dependent causal e↵ect of health education among clusters receiving the health education
intervention only, ↵101, the average ITT independent continuation causal e↵ect of mi-
crofinance among clusters receiving the microfinance intervention only,  t( 01t), and the
average ITT interaction e↵ect between health education and microfiance among clusters
receiving both interventions,  111. A positive estimate of  7, will indicate that health ed-
ucation and microfinance complement each other, whereas a negative estimate of  7, will
indicate that health education and microfinance substitute each other.
Standard errors are adjusted to account for the clustering nature of the data. To
mitigate concerns about the possibly small number of clusters that may emerge in response
to the cutting nature of our estimation, across cluster-level assignment status to both
interventions, standard are estimated using Bell and McCa↵rey’s (2002) Biased Reduced
Linearization (BRL) estimator.
The result are reported in Table 2.6. Panel A reports estimates for ( 5,  6,  7). It
also reports estimates for  5 +  7, the causal e↵ect of the health education education
intervention when built on top of the microfinance intervention;  6 +  7, the causal e↵ect
of the microfinance intervention when used as a platform for the implementation of the
health education intervention; and  5 +  6 +  7, the joint e↵ect of both interventions.
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Column 1 indicates that (i) both interventions are positive inputs for reducing neonatal
mortality, as they both independently reduce the likelihood that a newborn baby dies
within the first six weeks of life, and that (ii) they substitute each other, as their joint e↵ect
when o↵ered together is smaller then the sum of their independent e↵ects. Specifically,
it shows that neonatal mortality is reduced by 3.96 percentage points (s.e.=1.04) when
health education is o↵ered alone, by 1.69 percentage points (s.e.=0.70) when microfinance
is o↵ered alone, and by 2.79 percentage points (s.e.=0.82) when both interventions are
o↵ered simultaneously. That is, their interaction approximately halves the sum of their
individual impacts. An e↵ect that is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Columns 2 and 3 present estimates from a Logit specification adapted to Equation
(2.8). This serves two purposes. First, as a basic robustness check to the previous baseline
OLS estimates, and second, to better gauge their relative magnitudes. The estimated
marginal e↵ects in Column 3 are only slightly smaller than the OLS estimates. The esti-
mated odds ratios in Column 4 show that neonatal mortality reduces by 58% in response
to the health education intervention, and by 31% in response to the microfinance inter-
vention. O↵ering both interventions together reduces their individual e↵ectiveness by
85%.
To isolate the impact of the presence of microfinance per se on the e↵ectiveness of the
health education intervention, we need to purge the previous estimates of dimensions that
both drive the presence of microfinance and responses to the health education intervention.
We thus now allow the impact of the health education intervention to be heterogeneous
across districts and along each of the characteristics that in Section 2.6 were found to
di↵er across microfinance strata at baseline.7
We thus estimate the following specification
Yihvkt =  0 +  1Ek +  2Mk +  3(Ek ·Mk) +  4Tt +  5(Tt · Ek) +  6(Tt ·Mk) +  7(Tt · Ek ·Mk)
+  01Xihvk +  
0
2(Xihvk · Ek) +  03(Xihvk · Tt) +  04(Xihvk · Tt · Ek) + "ihvkt, (2.9)
where the vector Xihvk includes district dummies, the respondent’s number of past preg-
nancies, a dummy of whether she has a say in household decision-making, an index of
7Though not reported, these variables were not found to have been a↵ected by neither intervention,
either when o↵ered in isolation or when o↵ered jointly.
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ownership of household durable assets, and a dummy for whether her village has a mater-
nal or a child health care centre. Continuous variables in Xihv are appropriately rescaled
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Now, the parameter  7 identifies
the di↵erential e↵ectiveness of the Ekjut intervention across microfinance strata, over and
above its heterogeneity along the dimensions captured by the vector Xihv.
The results are reported in Table 2.7. To benchmark the analysis, Column 1 shows the
baseline estimates derived in the previous subsection. Column 2 controls for heterogeneity
of the Ekjut intervention with respect to the respondent’s number of past pregnancies,
Column 3 with respect to whether she has a say in household decision-making, Column
4 with respect to household asset ownership, Column 5 with respect to district location,
and Column 6 with respect to all these dimensions simultaneously. Column 7, in turn,
controls for heterogeneity with respect to the presence of a maternal or a child health
care centre in the village, using the restricted sample of clusters located in the districts of
Seraikela-Karshwan and West Singhbhum for which we have census data on village-level
amenities.
Overall, the results convincingly show that our previous estimates are robust to the
inclusion of these interactions. The estimate on the interaction e↵ect between the two
interventions not only does not decrease when allowing for these di↵erent sources of het-
erogeneity, but it actually appears to increase. This indicates that our initial estimate was
not picking up a spurious positive interaction of the Ekjut intervention with respect to
the observed improved characteristics found to hold in the microfinance stratum.
2.6.2 Mechanisms
Having ruled out that the substitutability is driven by the fact that mothers in villages
located in the microfinance stratum are better o↵ than mothers in villages located in the
non-microfinance stratum, we now re-estimate Eq.(2.8) replacing the dependent variable
with di↵erent care-seeking behaviours during pregnancy and home-care practices. The
goal is to understand the mechanisms through which each intervention acted on, both
when o↵ered in isolation and when o↵ered together. Again, the parameters of interest are
( 5,  6,  7), whose interpretation is analogous to that in sub-Section 2.6.1, though appro-
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priately adapted of the dependent variable in question.
The results are reported in Table 2.8. For each of these behaviours, Columns 1 to
3 report estimates of the independent causal e↵ect of the health education intervention,
the independent causal e↵ect of the microfinance intervention, and the interaction causal
e↵ect between the two interventions, respectively. Columns 4 to 6, in turn, report the
causal e↵ects of the health education intervention when built on top of the microfinance
intervention, the causal e↵ects of the microfinance intervention when used as platform for
the health education intervention, and the joint e↵ects of both interventions, respectively.
Overall the results suggest that the two interventions essentially acted through substi-
tutable channels in reducing neonatal mortality. Consistent with earlier results by Tripathy
et al. (2010), Column 1 shows that the health education intervention when o↵ered alone
led to an increase in the birth attendant’s use of a clean delivery kit and the adoption of
clean delivery practices, such as hand washing, use of gloves, use of boiled thread, and use
of plastic sheet for a clean delivery surface. Column 4 shows that some of these channels
appear to be substantially muted in the presence of the microfinance intervention. For
example, in communities without microfinance the health education intervention increased
the utilisation of safe-delivery kits by 22 percentage points (s.e.=6.9), however in commu-
nities with microfinance this e↵ects more than halves and is not significantly di↵erent than
zero.
Column 2 shows that the microfinance intervention, in turn, when o↵ered in isolation
led to a 10.4 percentage points increase in payments made to birth attendants (s.e.=4.8).
In contrast, Column 5 shows that when o↵ered together with the health education inter-
vention, we cannot reject the hypothesis that these payments were una↵ected. Finally,
Column 4 shows that when o↵ered on top of the microfinance intervention, the health
education intervention fully undoes its impact on these payments.
An exception to this pattern of substitutability is the uptake of antenatal checkup.
When o↵ered in isolation the microfinance intervention reduced the likelihood of the
mother having a checkup during pregnancy by 10.2 percentage points (s.e.=5.9). Yet,
when the health education intervention was o↵ered on top of the microfinance interven-
tion, the likelihood of this behaviour increased by 18.5 percentage points (s.e.=5.8). That
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is, health education not only curbed this apparent pernicious e↵ect of microfinance, but it
even appears to have reversed it. Overall, though, the pattern of substitutability between
microfinance and health education in improving health behaviours reported in Table 8
clearly outweighs this particular source of complementarity.
These results suggest that the presence of microfinance in a community, by allowing
households to pay for healthcare, reduces the need for information in alternative a↵ordable
health behaviors. Essentially, the presence of microfinance is thus thought to have a
similar role to that of variation in household assets. We can therefore check whether in
non-microfinance communities, the impact of the health education intervention is smaller
among wealthier households. Specifically, we estimate the following specification using
data from clusters not hosting the microfinance intervention
Yihkt =  0 +  1Ek +  2Tt +  3(Tt · Ek) +  1Aihk +  2(Aihk · Ek) +  3(Aihk · Tt)
+  4(Aihk · Tt · Ek) + "ihkt, (2.10)
where Aihk is a demeaned index of ownership of household durable assets. The parameter
 3 measures the average stand-alone ITT e↵ect of the health education intervention. The
parameter  4 measures the heterogeneity of this e↵ect with respect to household asset
ownership. Table 2.9 reports the results. Consistent with the hypothesis, the impact of
the health education intervention is greater among poorer households.
2.7 Conclusion
We have presented evidence from a stratified randomised controlled trial in rural India on
whether a health education intervention and a microfinance intervention complemented
or substituted each other in reducing neonatal mortality. Our central finding is that both
interventions were significantly and substantially more e↵ective when o↵ered in isolation
then when o↵ered together.
We interpret this result as suggestive evidence that increased financial constraints in
communities without access to microfinance, raised the need for knowledge on simple and
a↵ordable hygienic practices at home deliveries - thus making the health education inter-
vention more e↵ective there. Conversely, increased knowledge constraints in communities
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without access to the health education intervention, raised the need for the relaxation of
financial constraints in order to contract the services provided by the more expensive, and
hence potentially more skilled, birth attendants - thus making the microfinance interven-
tion more potent there.
A plausible alternative explanation that cannot be ruled out is the presence of dimin-
ishing returns to scale in the underlying health production function. It is generally under-
stood that health production is subject to the law of diminishing returns, even though in
his seminal theoretical work Grossman (1972) assumed constant returns to scale (see e.g.
Galama et al., 2012). Concavity of the health production function would precisely pre-
dict that both interventions are more e↵ective when o↵ered in isolation then when o↵ered
together.
Our key finding that health education and microfinance are more e↵ective when of-
fered in isolation, then when o↵ered jointly, is in stark contrast with conventional wisdom
suggesting that these two types of development interventions complement each other, and
should therefore be o↵ered together to poor communities. They are good news for policy
makers and donors alike whose budgets for development interventions are typically con-
strained. Although these findings hold under weak identifying assumptions, we cannot
rule the possibility of a bias in the estimation of this substitutability e↵ect driven by un-
observables that are both correlated to the presence of the microfinance intervention and
cause heterogenous responses to the health education intervention. Given the important
policy implications of our results, it is critical to further scrutinise them in future work.
2.A Appendix: Tables and Figures
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Table 2.1: Randomization of clusters into treatment and control groups, stratified by the
presence of microfinance
No Microfinance Microfinance
Districts Control Treatment Total Control Treatment Total Total
West Singbhum 3 2 5 3 4 7 12
Sarakila-Kharswan 4 5 9 2 1 3 12
Kehonjar 2 2 4 4 4 8 12
Total 9 9 18 9 9 18 36
Table 2.2: Neonatal mortality, care-seeking behaviour, and home-care practices
Mean OLS coefficients P-value on 
F-test for 
(2), (3), and (4)No intervention
Health 
education Microfinance Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Neonatal death
[=1 if infant died in first 6 weeks]
.045
(.207)
.017
{.012}
.011
(.007)
-.014
(.014)
[.291]
 Had health checkup
 [yes =1]
.538
(.499)
-.027
{.093}
-.001
(.095)
-.062
(.146)
[.802]
 Took iron tablets
 [yes =1]
.654
(.476)
-.009
{.085}
.026
(.087)
.012
(.116)
[.945]
 Had a tetanus injection
 [yes =1]
.643
(.479)
-.048
{.096}
.040
(.080)
-.015
(.116)
[.732]
 Institutional delivery
 [yes =1]
.128
(.335)
-.029
{.025}
.034
(.037)
-.020
(.046)
[.253]
 Made payments to BA
 [yes =1]
.651
(.477)
-.001
{.080}
-.022
(.057)
-.070
(.098)
[.511]
 BA used safe-delivery kit†
 [yes =1]
.098
(.297)
-.005
{.041}
.021
(.044)
-.024
(.066)
[.932]
 BA washed hands with soap†
 [yes =1]
.276
(.447)
.035
{.115}
-.012
(.088)
.009
(.140)
[.933]
 BA used plastic sheet†
 [yes =1]
.061
(.240)
-.023
{.058}
.049
(.072)
-.007
(.093)
[.884]
 BA used gloves†
 [yes =1]
.040
(.198)
-.017
{.013}
-.020
(.015)
.013
(.017)
[.414]
 BA tied cord with boiled thread†
 [yes =1]
.144
(.351)
.001
{.042}
.033
(.050)
-.010
(.069)
[.981]
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Sample used is all observations at the baseline year (number 
of observations = 4,437, number of clusters = 36). Means, OLS estimates, standard deviations reported in parentheses, standard errors in curly 
brackets, p-values reported in squared brackets † Excludes institutional deliveries. For each row, OLS coefficients and corresponding standard errors 
in Columns 2-4, as well as p-values reported in Column 5, are obtained from an OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on a dummy for 
whether the observation comes from the treatment or the control group, on a dummy for whether it comes from the microfinance or the non-
microfinance stratum, and on the interaction between these two dummies, plus district dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level.
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Table 2.3: Individual and household level characteristics
Mean OLS coefficients P-value on
F-test for 
(2), (3), and (4)No intervention
Health 
education Microfinance Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age at interview
[years]
25.57
(5.56)
.361
{.705}
-.764
{.655}
.051
{.848}
[.199]
Age at first pregnancy
[years]
18.93
(2.36)
-.084
{.344}
-.535
{.359}
.306
{.452}
[.327]
Age at marriage
[years]
19.73
(2.54)
.204
{.423}
-.312
{.421}
.006
{.514}
[.474]
Past pregnancies
[number]
2.63
(1.21)
.165
{.135}
-.256**
{.148}
.193
{.230}
[.071]
Literate 
[yes =1]
.270
(.444)
-.074
{.049}
.071
{.055}
-.019
{.085}
[.190]
Tribal member 
[yes =1]
.746
(.435)
.028
{.045}
-.116
{.057}
.078
{.075}
[.099]
Hindu
[yes =1]
.492
(.500)
-.042
{.068}
.052
{.056}
-.021
{.079}
[.403]
Say over health care decisions 
[yes =1]
.254
(.436)
-.008
{.085}
.194**
{.095}
-.061
{.159}
[.153]
Household assets
[score 1-10]
1.394
(1.196)
-.423***
{.122}
.232*
{.139}
.186
{.213}
[.002]
Household owns at least 2 bighas of 
land [yes =1]
.435
(.496)
-.072
{.087}
-.047
{.073}
.089
{.114}
[.845]
Household has a BPL card
[yes =1]
.654
(.473)
.027
{.047}
-.011
{.053}
.002
{.074}
[.882]
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Sample used is all observations at the baseline year (number 
of observations = 4,437, number of clusters = 36). Means, OLS estimates, standard deviations reported in parentheses, standard errors in curly 
brackets, p-values reported in squared brackets † Excludes institutional deliveries. For each row, OLS coefficients and corresponding standard errors 
in Columns 2-4, as well as p-values reported in Column 5, are obtained from an OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on a dummy for 
whether the observation comes from the treatment or the control group, on a dummy for whether it comes from the microfinance or the non-
microfinance stratum, and on the interaction between these two dummies, plus district dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the cluster level. 
Whether the respondent was considered to be literate or not was decided by the interviewer as a function of the  respondent’s ability to read a 
passage that was presented to her. The asset score is the the first principal of of dummy variables capturing ownership of the following household 
assets: bicycle, motorcycle, radio, fridge, tv, fan, tape, battery, generator, and electricity. Say over health care decisions is a dummy that equals one 
if the respondent mother reports to have a say in the household decision on whether she could seek care in case of illness. 
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Table 2.4: Village level characteristics
Mean OLS coefficients P-value on 
F-test for 
(2), (3), and (4)No intervention
Health 
education Microfinance Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Area
[in hectares]
341.19
(306.30)
76.26
{77.87}
-110.55
{87.92}
23.97
{119.91}
[.056]
Households
[number]
136.30
(78.63)
34.66
{31.69}
38.42
{22.81}
-43.02
{44.75}
[.196]
Household size
[number of persons per household]
5.089
(.569)
-.060
{.208}
-.060
{.109}
.237
{.237}
[.560]
Distance to nearest town
[in kilometers]
24.59
(21.10)
3.75
{10.26}
-8.34
{8.84}
-8.55
{12.34}
[.398]
General health care centre
[yes =1]
.081
(.273)
.012
{0.63}
.080
{.093}
-.075
{.131}
[.862]
Maternal/child health centre
[yes =1]
.058
(.235)
.003
{.079}
.380***
{.117}
-.110
{.199}
[.008]
Primary school
[yes =1]
.732
(.443}
.079
{.085}
.000
{.060}
-.036
{.102}
[.719]
Middle/secondary school
[yes =1]
.232
(.423)
-.044
{.097}
.011
{.082}
.168
{.177}
[.756]
Electricity for domestic use
[yes =1]
.108
(.311)
-.056
{.050}
.016
{.058}
.094
{.084}
[.467]
Wet land
[% of irrigated agricultural land]
.041
(.103)
.018
{.027}
-.003
{.025}
.078
{.052}
[.175]
Dry land
[% of unirrigated agricultural land]
.462
(.214)
.058
{.081}
.090
{.077}
-.094
{.117}
[.619]
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Sample used is all observations at the baseline year in the 
districts of Seraikela-Karshwan and West Singhbhum (number of observations = 3,046, number of clusters = 24). Means, OLS estimates, standard 
deviations reported in parentheses, standard errors in curly brackets, p-values reported in squared brackets. For each row, OLS coefficients and 
corresponding standard errors in Columns 2-4, as well as p-values reported in Column 5, are obtained from an OLS regression of the corresponding 
characteristic on a dummy for whether the observation comes from the treatment or the control group, on a dummy for whether it comes from the 
microfinance or the non-microfinance stratum, and on the interaction between these two dummies, plus district dummies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the cluster level.
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Table 2.5: Correlates of participation in the Ekjut meetings
Microfinance versus non-microfinance strata
Full Sample
No microfinance
stratum
Microfinance
stratum
Difference
(3) - (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Microfinance intervention
[=1 if cluster located in microfinance stratum]
-.107*
(.057)
Age at interview
[years]
-.001
(.002)
.002
(.002)
-.003
(003)
[.214]
Age at marriage
[years]
.012
(.007)
.014
(.010)
.006
(.005)
[.512]
Age at first pregnancy
[years]
-.010
(.007)
-.012
(.007)
-.002
(008)
[.120]
Number of past pregnancies
[number]
.052***
(.010)
.043***
(.011)
.060***
(.014)
[.382]
Literate 
[yes =1]
.030**
(.014)
.030
(.023)
.020
(.016)
[.719]
Tribal member
[yes =1]
.019
(.046)
.001
(.075)
.046
(.042)
[.609]
Hindu
[yes =1]
-.037
(.042)
.002
(.055)
-.055
(.051)
[.974]
Say over health care decisions
[yes =1]
.023
(.039)
-.021
(.058)
.034
(.039)
[.443]
Household assets
[first principal component]
-.008
(.009)
-.026***
(.007)
.010
(.014)
[.032]
Household owns at least 2 bighas of land
[yes =1]
.038
(.029)
.072
(.046)
-.001
(.024)
[.172]
Household has a BPL card 
[yes =1]
.025
(.016)
.039
(.023)
.008
(.016)
[.826]
District effects Yes Yes
R-squared .1063 .1232
Number of observations (clusters) 9249 (18) 9249 (18)
Notes. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Standard errors clustered at the cluster level. 
Dependent variable is a dummy =1 if the respondent mother participates in an Ekjut group, 0 otherwise. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses. Column 1 presents estimates obtained from a single regression. Column 2-4 presents estimates from a single 
regression. 
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Table 2.6: Estimates of intent-to-treat e↵ects on neonatal and fetal mortality
OLS Logit
Marginal effect
(1)
Marginal effect
(2)
Odds ratio
(3)
Main coefficients
Health education only
⟨TE⟩
-.040***
(.010)
-.039***
(.009)
.535**
[.326-.878]
Microfinance only
⟨TM⟩
-.017**
(.007)
-.016**
(.007)
.525***
[.369-.746]
Interaction
⟨TEM⟩
.028**
(.012)
.027**
(.011)
1.625
[.881-2.999]
Additional coefficients
Health education with microfinance
⟨TE+TEM⟩
-.012*
(.007)
-.012*
(.006)
.996
[.986-1.007]
Microfinance with health education 
⟨TM+TEM⟩
.011
(.010)
.012
(.008)
.995
[.980-1.010]
Health education and microfinance
⟨TE+TM+TEM⟩
-.029***
(.008)
-.027***
(.008)
.978***
[.966-.990]
  {Pseudo} R-squared .0017 {.0041}
  Clusters 36 36
  Observations 22,370 22,370
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. Mean marginal effects, odds ratios, BRL standard 
errors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses, 95% confidence intervals reported in brackets. Mean baseline 
probability of the infant dying in the first six weeks of life is 5.37%. Mean baseline probability of the infant being stillborn is 
3.78%.
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Table 2.7: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Health education only
⟨TE⟩
-.042***
(.011)
-.043***
(.011)
-.043***
(.011)
-.041***
(.010)
-.048**
(.021)
-.046**
(.022)
-.041**
(.015)
Microfinance only
⟨TM⟩
-.018**
(.007)
-.020**
(.007)
-.018**
(.008)
-.019**
(.007)
-.020***
(.007)
-.023***
(.008)
-.022**
(.011)
Interaction
⟨TEM⟩
.029**
(.013)
.031**
(.007)
.027**
(.013)
.029**
(.012)
.037**
(.016)
.036**
(.017)
.040**
(.011)
Controlling for Ekjut treatment 
effect heterogeneity with: None
Past 
pregnancies
Intrahousehold 
say
Household 
asset score
District 
effects
All individual/
household 
factors and 
district effects
Maternal/child 
health care 
centre
R-squared .0017 .0027 .0018 .0025 .0032 .0050 .0041
Observations (clusters) 23,189 (36) 22,370 (36) 22,370 (36) 22,370 (36) 22,370 (36) 22,370 (36) 15,370 (24)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, at * 10% level. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the baby died within the first six 
weeks of life. BRL standard errors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses. Each column presents results obtained from a single regression. Columns 1-6 use the 
full dataset. Column 7 uses data from the districts of Seraikela-Karshwan and West Singhbhum, for which census information on village level amenities is available.
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Table 2.8: Mechanisms
Main parameters Additional parameters
Health 
Education only
⟨TE⟩
Microfinance 
only
⟨TM⟩
Interaction
⟨TEM⟩
Health 
Education 
with 
Microfinance
⟨TE+TEM⟩
Microfinance  
with
Health 
Education
⟨TM+TEM⟩
Health 
Education 
and 
Microfinance
⟨TE+TM+TEM⟩ R-squared
Observations
[clusters]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable:
Had health checkup
[yes =1]
-.007
(.075)
-.102*
(.059)
.192**
(.095)
.185***
(.058)
.090
(.074)
.084
(.076)
.0179 22,370 [36]
Took iron tablets
[yes =1]
-.007
(.048)
-.127**
(.059)
.078
(.073)
.071
(.055)
-.049
(.043)
-.056
(.049)
.0101 22,370 [36]
Had tetanus injection
[yes =1]
.023
(.041)
-.053
(.042)
.037
(.053)
.060*
(.034)
-.016
(.032)
-.064
(.117)
.0119 22,370 [36]
Institutional delivery
[yes =1]
-.040
(.030)
-.013
(.039)
.034
(.047)
-.006
(.036)
.021
(.026)
-.019
(.038)
.0097 22,370 [36]
Made payments to BA†
[yes =1]
-.026
(.041)
.104**
(.048)
-.087
(.069)
-.113**
(.055)
.017
(.049)
-.009
(.050)
.0150 22,370 [36]
BA used safe-delivery kit†
[yes =1]
.220***
(.069)
.056
(.065)
-.130
(.092)
.090
(.060)
-.074
(.065)
.146**
(.066)
.0516 22,370 [36]
BA washed hands with soap†
[yes =1]
.237**
(.104)
-.025
(.084)
-.181
(.136)
.056
(.087)
-.206*
(.106)
.031
(.087)
.0545 22,370 [36]
BA used plastic sheet†
[yes =1]
.183***
(.051)
.021
(.057)
-.008
(.082)
.175***
(.064)
.013
(.059)
.196***
(.057)
.0631 22,370 [36]
BA tied cord with boiled thread†
[yes =1]
.248***
(.086)
-.059
(.048)
-.070
(.125)
.177*
(.092)
-.129
(.116)
.119
(.095)
.0753 22,370 [36]
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. OLS estimates. BRL standard errors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses. † Excludes institutional deliveries. 
Each row presents results obtained from a single regression.
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Table 2.9: Heterogeneity of ITT of health education intervention with respect to household asset ownership
Baseline Household assets 
Health education -.040***!
(.010)
-.037***!
(.010)
Health education X Household asset score - .019***!
(.007)
R-squared .0017 .0026
Observations 11,293 11,293
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 1% level. Dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the 
baby died within the first six weeks of life. BRL standard errors clustered at the cluster level reported in parentheses. Each column 
presents results obtained from a single regression. Both columns use the full dataset. The asset score is the demeaned sum of 
dummy variables capturing ownership of the following household assets: bicycle, motorcycle, radio, fridge, tv, fan, tape, battery, 
generator, and electricity.!
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3
Multidimensional Assortative Matching
3.1 Introduction
In a unidimensional marriage market, Becker (1973) has shown that complementarity
between partners’ attributes in the joint output function leads to positive assortative
matching, i.e. better (say) educated females match with better educated males. Chiappori,
McCann and Nesheim (2010) argue that this much celebrated notion of positive assortative
matching does not extend naturally to multi-dimensions. Yet, empirical evidence strongly
suggests that individuals tend to match with, and have a preference for, similar partners
in a variety of traits (Hitsch, Hortac¸su and Ariely, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2011).
In a multi-dimensional marriage market, I derive a simple and intuitive condition on
the joint output function that ensures positive assortative matching on multiple traits.
This condition naturally nests Becker’s result for the unidimensional setting.1 I then show
1However, in the multidimensional setting, supermodularity on a given trait, though necessary, is not
su cient for positive assortative matching on that trait.
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that matching preferences are such that, away from their optimal partners, agents are
willing to compensate mismatches on one attribute with opposite mismatches on other
attributes. That is, it is all right for females (males) to be a little less good looking if they
are also a little more educated, or a little less educated if they are also a little more good
looking.
More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on multidimensional matching in
the following ways. First, I develop a transferable utility model that extends the unidimen-
sional notion of assortative matching to a multidimensional setting. Using techniques from
the mathematical literature on optimal transportation, Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim
(2010) have analyzed the existence and uniqueness of multidimensional assignments un-
der transferable utility, and have in particular established purity of the assignment. Yet,
purity simply means that the assignment matching males to females is deterministic (i.e.
one-to-one), and not necessarily assortative. In fact, the authors argue that the concept
of (positive) assortative matching in the unidimensional setting is not well defined in a
multidimensional setting. In this paper, I show that when agents traits are jointly uni-
formly distributed in the unit square, multidimensional positive assortative matching is
well defined.
Second, I solve in closed form a model of matching along multiple continuous dimen-
sions under transferable utility. Chiappori, Ore ce and Quintana-Domeque (2012b) and
Banerjee et al. (2011) also solve in closed form a model of matching along two traits - the
former within a transferable utility setting and the latter within a non-transferable utility
setting - but they both consider the case where one of the traits is continuous and the
other is discrete.
Third, I characterize the sorting trade-o↵s across di↵erent traits that agents face in
the marriage market both along and outside the equilibrium path. This is a first attempt
to derive iso-attractiveness curves in a “truly” multidimensional marriage market. Chiap-
pori, Ore ce and Quintana-Domeque (2012a) also examine iso-attractiveness curves but
in a context where multiple matching dimensions are collapsed into a single index. Fur-
thermore, in this paper the equilibrium trade-o↵s that agents make in the marriage market
can be thought as being the outcome of random search frictions a la Atakan (2006). Our
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analysis thus also departs from Galichon and Salani (2012), who explicitly model multi-
dimensional matching but in a frictionless framework.
I acknowledge that after having independently discovered the main finding of this
paper, which generalizes the unidimensional notion of assortative matching to a multi-
dimensional setting, I learnt that Lindenlaub (2013) also independently made the same
discovery.
Throughout the paper I assume that attributes are uniformly distributed on the unit
square. Clearly this is a strong restriction, which would be easily be rejected in the data.
Yet, this condition is su cient, but not necessary, for two-dimensional positive assortative
matching to hold. Although I do not explore this route in this paper, I believe that more
complex distributions would still be possible as long there is a similar correlation struc-
ture between attributes across gender, i.e. symmetric copulas across gender. Otherwise
some sort of non-assortative matching will follow trivially. However, leaving aside distri-
butional concerns, this paper isolates in a precise, and hopefully intuitive away, the role
of technology, namely of multidimensional complementarities in the joint output function,
in explaining multidimensional assortative matching and mating preferences.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets out the model, and introduces two
key objects: the a nity matrix and the sorting matrix. Section 3.3 derives the main result
of this paper, which extends unidimensional assortative matching to a multidimensional
setting. Section 3.4 counterfactually moves beyond the perfectly competitive environment,
allowing me to derive mating preferences over the entire set of potential partners in the
marriage market. Section 3.5 provides a parametric example, which allows me to solve
the model in closed form. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Agents and Marriage Market
The marriage market is populated by a continuum of males and females. A male is indexed
by a two-dimensional vector of traits x = (x1, x2) 2 [0, 1]2. The first and second traits,
x1 and x2, are (say) his level of education and his looks, respectively. Similarly, a female
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is indexed by y = (y1, y2) 2 [0, 1]2, where y1 is her level of education and y2 is her looks.
I assume that both x and y are uniformly distributed. Males and female match pairwise
in a perfectly competitive marriage market environment.
3.2.2 Technology
When male x and female y form a match, they produce positive output f(x,y)   0. It is
assumed that f is twice continuously di↵erentiable, with Dxf(x,y) > 0 and Dyf(x,y) >
0.
Here, as in the unidimensional setting studied by Becker (1973), complementarities
across the partners’ traits will be shown to play a critical role in determining who matches
with whom in equilibrium. I now thus introduce the matrix of second-order cross-partial
derivatives of f(x,y) with respect to x and y,
D2xyf(x,y) =
26664
@2f(x,y)
@x1@y1
@2f(x,y)
@x1@y2
@2f(x,y)
@x2@y1
@2f(x,y)
@x2@y2
37775 , (3.1)
which Dupuy and Galichon (2012) have termed the a nity matrix. The main diago-
nal isolates the within-traits complementarities. Specifically, the (1, 1)th entry measures
the degree of complementarity between partners’ education levels, and the (2, 2)th entry
measures the degree of complementarity between partners’ looks. The anti-diagonal, in
turn, isolates the between-traits complementarities. Specifically, the (2, 1)th entry mea-
sures the degree of complementarity between males’ education and females’ looks, and the
(1, 2)th entry measures the degree of complementarity between males’ looks and females’
education.
3.2.3 Assignment
The assignment matching males with females is governed by a measure-preserving mapping
µ(x) = y, which means that male x is married with female y. Specifically, this mapping
is a vector field µ(x) = (µ1(x), µ2(x)) = (y1, y2) = y, where for a given male x the first
component gives his partner’s education level, i.e. µ1(x) = y1, and the second component
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gives his partner’s looks, i.e. µ2(x) = y2.
In this paper, I am interested in studying (positive) assortative assignments. An as-
signment is said to be assortative if (i) it is pure (one-to-one or deterministic), i.e. a
male is matched with one and only one female, and (ii) monotonic. In the unidimensional
setting, where agents are heterogeneous only with respect to (say) their education levels, a
deterministic monotonic assignment means that the function µ1(x1) = y1 is either mono-
tonically increasing (or decreasing). That is, more educated males are married with more
(less) educated females.
In my two-dimensional setting there are two possible positive assortative assignments.2
The first entails positive assortativeness within both traits, i.e. better educated males
marry better educated females, and better looking males marry better looking females -
which I term by within-attribute positive assortative matching. The second entails positive
assortativeness between the two traits, i.e. better educated males marry better looking
females, and better looking males marry better educated females - which I term by between-
attribute positive assortative matching.
These two alternative two-dimensional positive assortative assignments can be equiv-
alently defined in terms of the gradient of µ(x)
Dxµ(x) =
26664
@µ1(x)
@x1
@µ2(x)
@x1
@µ1(x)
@x2
@µ2(x)
@x2
37775 , (3.2)
which I term the sorting matrix. If the assignment is within-attribute positively assorta-
tive, then this matrix is the identity matrix. If, alternatively, the assignment is between-
attribute positively assortative, then this matrix has ones on its anti-diagonal and zeros
on its main diagonal.3 Figure 3.1 illustrates these two alternative sorting patterns.
2Though I focus on positive assortative matching, my analysis and results apply to negative assortative
matching.
3If a given component µi(x) is strictly increasing in xj , then due their measure-preserving nature, it has
to be the case that µi(x) = xj . That is, a given male (female) attribute can be monotonically related with at
most one female (male) attribute. As a result, µ(x1, x2) = (µ1(x1), µ2(x2)) = (x1, x2) under within-traits
positive assortative matching, and µ(x1, x2) = (µ1(x1), µ2(x2)) = (x2, x1) under between-traits positive
assortative matching.
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3.2.4 Competitive Market Equilibrium
Matching takes place in a perfectly competitive environment. Men’s attributes are observ-
able and ‘priced’, with p(x,y) denoting the transfer received by a man with attributes x
matched with a woman with attributes y. Women’s attributes are observable and priced,
with q(x,y) denoting the transfer received by a woman with attributes y matched with a
man with attributes x. The output generated by match between a male x and a female
y is thus given by f(x,y) = p(x,y) + q(x,y).
Taking the transfer schedules (or prices) as given, each woman chooses the man with
whom she wishes to match. That is, female y solves
max
x
f(x,y)  p(x,y). (3.3)
The first-order condition equates marginal prices to marginal productivities along the
equilibrium path
Dxf(x, µ(x)) Dxp(x, µ(x)) = 0. (3.4)
The second-order condition is that the Hessian matrix evaluated along the equilibrium
path is negative definite
H = D2xxf(x, µ(x)) D2xxp(x, µ(x))   0. (3.5)
3.3 Multidimensional Assortative Matching
This section presents the main result of this paper. It derives su cient conditions on
the technology, namely on the a nity matrix (3.1), in order to obtain within-attribute
positive assortative matching in equilibrium, i.e. for the sorting matrix (3.2) to be the
identity matrix.
Following Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), if I totally di↵erentiate the first-order condi-
tion (3.4) with respect to x, and use (3.4), yields
D2xxf(x, µ(x)) D2xxp(x, µ(x)) =  D2xyf(x, µ(x))⇥Dxµ(x). (3.6)
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The second-order condition (3.5) is thus equivalent to positive definiteness of the product
between the a nity matrix (3.1) and the sorting matrix (3.2)4
D2xyf(x, µ(x))⇥Dxµ(x) =
26664
@2f(x, µ(x))
@x1@y1
@2f(x, µ(x))
@x1@y2
@2f(x, µ(x))
@x2@y1
@2f(x, µ(x))
@x2@y2
37775
26664
@µ1(x)
@x1
@µ2(x)
@x1
@µ1(x)
@x2
@µ2(x)
@x2
37775   0.
(3.7)
I am now ready to characterize a set of su cient conditions on the joint production
function f(x,y) in order to obtain within-attribute positive assortative matching. To
arrive at these conditions, simply observe that since under such assignment the sorting
matix is the identity matrix, we have that D2xyf(x, µ(x)) ⇥ Dxµ(x) = D2xyf(x, µ(x)).
Hence, the second-order condition in (3.7) boils down to symmetric positive definiteness
of the a nity matrix. As a result, within-attribute positive assortative matching obtains
when: (i) partners’ educational levels are complementary, @2f(x,y)/@x1@y1 > 0, (ii)
partners’ looks are complementary, @2f(x,y)/@x1@y1 > 0, and (iii) the determinant of
the a nity matrix is positive, which given monotonicity of the square root is equivalent
to s
@2f(x,y)
@x1@y1
⇥ @
2f(x,y)
@x2@y2
>
s
@2f(x,y)
@x1@y2
⇥ @
2f(x,y)
@x2@y1
,
i.e. the geometric average within-attribute complementarity is larger than the geometric
average between-trait complementarity.
Proposition 1 (Matching of likes). In a two-dimensional marriage market with trans-
ferable utility, where individuals’ attributes are distributed uniformly on the unit square,
the equilibrium matching will be positively assortative along both dimensions if the joint
output function is supermodular along both attributes, and the geometric average within-
supermodularity is greater than the geometric average between-supermodularity.
Also observe that the equilibrium further requires the matrix in (3.7) to be symmetric.
To see this, observe that positive definiteness of D2xyf(x, µ(x)) ⇥ Dxµ(x) only ensures
that the assignment µ(x) is a maximum of the objective function in (3.3). But for this
4Negative definiteness of the Hessian matrix H means that its leading principal minors |Hk|, for k =
{1, 2}, are negative for odd k and positive for even k. But, since |Hk| =
   (D2xyf(x,y)Dxµ(x))k   =
( 1)k   (D2xyf(x,y)Dxµ(x))k  , this is equivalent to the 2 leading principal minors of D2xyf(x,y)Dxµ(x)
being both positive.
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assignment to be a competitive equilibrium, the price schedule p(x) sustaining it must
exist. Standard integrability conditions from multivariate calculus (see, e.g., Theorem
3.4 in Lang (1997)), tell us that a necessary and su cient condition for such function
to exist is symmetry of the matrix of its second-order partial derivatives D2xxp(x), i.e.
@2p(x)/@x1@x2 = @2p(x)/@x2@x1. From (3.6), this matrix is equal to
D2xxp(x) = D
2
xxf(x, µ(x)) +D
2
xyf(x, µ(x))⇥Dxµ(x).
Since by continuity of f(x,y), D2xxf(x, µ(x)) is symmetric, then symmetry of D
2
xxp(x)
requires symmetry of D2xyf(x, µ(x))⇥Dxµ(x).
At this point it is useful to relate the main result of this paper to Chiappori, McCann
and Nesheim (2010), who argue that the notion of positive assortative matching cannot
be extended to a multidimensional setting. These authors have shown that if Dxf(x,y)
is injective with respect to y (the twist condition), then the assignment is pure, i.e a
male is matched with one and only one female, for any distributions of x and of y.5 My
result is a special case of theirs since my condition that D2xyf(x,y) is positive definite
ensures that Dxf(x,y) is injective with respect to y, and the resulting positive assortative
assignment that I obtain implies purity. What allows me to go beyond purity and extend
the unidimensional notion of positive assortative matching to a multidimensional setting,
are my simplifying distributional assumptions, namely that x and y are both uniformly
distributed.
Finally observe that my main result nests Becker’s unidimensional assortative matching
result. To see this, suppose that agents are heterogeneous with respect to one attribute
only, say education. In such case, our conditions would boil down to
@2f(x1, y1)
@x1@y1
⇥ @µ1(x1)
@x1
> 0,
and positive assortative matching on education, i.e. @µ1(x1)/@x1 = 1, would emerge under
complementarity in partners’ educational levels, i.e. @2f(x1, y1)/@x1@y1 > 0.
5See also Dizdar and Moldovanu (2013) and Dizdar (2013) who also use the twist condition to examine
multidimensional assignments with transferable utility.
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3.4 Mating Preferences Across Potential Partners
The goal of this section is to derive individuals’ mating preferences across the entire set
of potential partners. The previous section allowed us to derive payo↵s only along the
perfectly competitive equilibrium matching path. In order to derive individuals’ payo↵s
under alternative matches, I thus need to adopt some non-competitive procedure that
splits the joint output between partners in such matches.
To do so, I follow the standard approach that connects bargaining theory with the
theory of competitive equilibrium in markets. Specifically, I assume that every potential
couple Nash bargains the split of their joint output, with the disagreement points being
given by their perfectly competitive payo↵s. The word potential is emphasised because in
a perfectly competitive market these couples will never form. The resulting payo↵s can
thus be interpreted as being counterfactual, in the sense that they give the payo↵ a person
would have had if instead of matching with the perfectly competitive partner he or she
had matched with someone else. Clearly, in real marriage markets that are subject to
imperfections, such as search frictions, these non-ideal matches may actually take place.
Hence, for any male x and any female y that potentially matches together, they will
Nash bargain their joint output, f(x,y), in excess of their perfectly competitive payo↵s,
which I denote by p?(x) and q?(y) respectively. Under symmetric (exogenous) bargaining
power, each partner thus obtains half of this surplus, (f(x,y)  p?(x)  q?(y))/2, plus his
or her perfectly competitive payo↵. Anchoring the analysis around the latter, it follows
that the marital payo↵ of any male x as a function of y = x +  , with   = ( 1,  2) =
(y1   x1, y2   x2) 2 [ 1, 1]2, is given by
p⇧(x,x+  ) =
1
2
[f(x,x+  ) + p?(x)  q?(x+  )]. (3.8)
3.4.1 Single-Peaked Mating Preferences
The first thing to note is that individuals’ payo↵s are single peaked at   = 0, i.e. at
their (perfectly competitive) optimal partners y = x. To see this, observe that a critical
point of (3.8) is found by solving Dyf(x,x +  )   Dyq?(x +  ) = 0. But since from
the previous section (see first-order condition (3.4)) we know that under the competitive
103
equilibrium assignment, marginal transfers (or prices) equal marginal productivities, we
have that Dyq?(x+  ) = Dyf(x+  ,x+  ), and therefore a critical point must solve
Dyf(x,x+  ) Dyf(x+  ,x+  ) = 0. (3.9)
Naturally, equation (3.9) holds true at   = 0. To confirm that the zero mismatch is the
unique global maximiser, I check that the matrix of second-order derivates of the payo↵
function (3.8) with respect to   is negative definite at   = 0. This matrix, obtained by
di↵erentiating the left-hand side of (3.9) with respect to  , is given by
D2yyf(x,x+  ) D2xyf(x+  ,x+  ) D2yyf(x+  ,x+  ), (3.10)
which at   = 0 collapses to  D2xyf(x,x). Now, since D2xyf(x,y) is positive definite, it
follows that (3.10) is negative definite, thus confirming that   = 0 is indeed the unique
global maximiser. Hence, as in the unidimensional setting (see, e.g. Shimer and Smith,
2000), multidimensional positive assortative matching is associated with an endogenous
preference for likes.
Moving now to individuals’ marital payo↵s with partners other than their soul mates,
I focus on two types of such mismatches. First, same-directional mismatches: where one
of the partners is more attractive than the other on both attributes ( 1 > 0 and  2 > 0, or
 1 < 0 and  2 < 0). Second, opposite-directional mismatches: where one of the partners is
more attractive than the other on one of the traits, but less attractive on the other trait
( 1 > 0 and  2 < 0, or  1 < 0 and  2 > 0). The question is thus: what is the di↵erential
reduction in martial payo↵s induced by these two types of mismatches?
3.4.2 Opposite-Direction Mismatches
Let me first analyse the change in male x’s payo↵ p⇧(x,x +  ) induced by an opposite-
directional marginal mismatch. Specifically, and to simplify the algebra, consider the case
where the magnitudes of the mismatches on both dimensions are equal in absolute value,
i.e.  1 =   2 > 0. Clearly, I am not interested in evaluating this di↵erence at the critical
point   = 0, because there the curvature of the payo↵ function is flat. Instead, I evaluate
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it at y˜ = (x1 + k, x2   k) for a small k > 0. Thus, the change in p⇧(x, y˜) induced by an
infinitesimally small increase in k, is given by the directional derivative of p⇧(x, y˜) along
the vector vˆ = h0, 0, 1, 1i, i.e.
rv˜ p⇧(x, y˜) = @p
⇧(x, y˜)
@y1
 @p
⇧(x, y˜)
@y2
=
✓
@f(x, y˜)
@y1
  @f(y˜, y˜)
@y1
◆
 
✓
@f(x, y˜)
@y2
  @f(y˜, y˜)
@y2
◆
.
(3.11)
Equation (3.11) indicates that the e↵ect on p⇧(x, yˆ) induced by this type of mismatch,
acts through the following channels. First, an increase in his partner’s looks, over and
above his own looks, will increase both the output they produce together (contributing
to an increase in his payo↵) as well as the output she produces with her outside option
partner (contributing to a decrease in his payo↵). Second, a decrease in his partners’
educational level, over and below his own educational level, will decrease both the output
they produce together (contributing to a decrease in his payo↵) as well as the output she
produces with her outside option partner (contributing to an increase in his payo↵). To
understand the sign and the overall magnitude of (3.11), let k be infinitesimally small.
This implies that (3.11) becomes the directional derivative of rvˆ p⇧(x, y˜) along the vector
u˜ = h 1, 1, 0, 0i, i.e.
ru˜ (rv˜ p⇧(x, y˜)) = ru˜
✓
@f(y˜, y˜)
@y1
◆
 ruˆ
✓
@f(y˜, y˜)
@y2
◆
=  @
2f(y˜, y˜)
@x1@y1
  @
2f(y˜, y˜)
@x2@y2
+
@f(y˜, yˆ)
@x1@y2
+
@f(y˜, y˜)
@x2@y1
. (3.12)
Equation (3.12) shows that an opposite-directional mismatch has two competing e↵ects
on male x’s payo↵. One is negative and driven by the within-attributes complementarities,
the other one is positive and driven by the between-attributes complementarities. To
understand these e↵ects, it is crucial to observe that when male x matches with a female
that is better good looking but less educated than himself, this female’s outside option
partner is also better good looking but less educated than him.
As a result, the positive impact of her improved looks on their joint output is, on
one hand, smaller, and on the other hand, larger, than that on the output she produces
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together with her outside option partner. Smaller, because x is not as good looking as
her outside option partner, and males’ and females’ looks complement each other. Larger,
because x is better educated than her outside option partner, and males’ educational levels
and females’ looks are complementary.
Similarly, the negative impact of her reduced education on their joint output is, on
one hand, larger, and on the other hand, smaller, than that on the output she produces
together with her outside option. Larger, because x is better educated than her out-
side option partner, and males and females’ educational levels complement each other.
Smaller, because x is not as good looking as her outside option partner, and males’ looks
complement females’ educational levels.
Finally, it is easy to show that when the geometric average within-attribute com-
plementarity is larger than the geometric average between-attribute complementarity, as
assumed, the overall e↵ect given by (3.12) is negative. To ease notation, let fij denote
@2f/@xi@xj . The goal is then to show that if f11f22 > f212, then f11+f22 > 2f12. Suppose
otherwise, i.e f12 = (f11+f22+k)/2 with k > 0. In such case, f11f22 > ((f11+f22+k)/2)2
would have to hold. An impossibility, since this inequality is equivalent to (f11   f22)2 <
 (2(f11 + f22) + k)k, which clearly cannot hold as a positive number cannot be smaller
than a negative number.
3.4.3 Same-Direction Mismatches
I now analyse the change in p⇧(x,x+ ) induced by a same-directional marginal mismatch.
Specifically, consider the case where the magnitudes of the mismatches on both dimensions
are equal and positive, i.e.  1 =  2 > 0. For the same reason as before, I do not want to
evaluate this di↵erence at the critical point   = 0, i.e. y = x. Instead, I evaluate it at
yˆ = (x1+k, x2+k) for a small k > 0. The change in p⇧(x, yˆ) induced by an infinitesimally
small increase in k, is thus given by the directional derivative of p⇧(x, yˆ) along the vector
vˆ = h0, 0, 1, 1i, i.e.
rvˆ p⇧(x, yˆ) = @p
⇧(x, yˆ)
@y1
+
@p⇧(x, yˆ)
@y2
=
✓
@f(x, yˆ)
@y1
  @f(yˆ, yˆ)
@y1
◆
+
✓
@f(x, yˆ)
@y2
  @f(yˆ, yˆ)
@y2
◆
.
(3.13)
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Equation (3.13) shows that an increase in his partner’s educational level and looks, over
and above his own educational level and looks, will increase both the output they produce
together (contributing to an increase in his payo↵) as well as the output she produces
with her outside option partner (contributing to a decrease in his payo↵). Again, making
k infinitesimally small, equation (3.13) becomes the directional derivative of rvˆ p⇧(x, yˆ)
along the vector uˆ = h 1, 1, 0, 0i, i.e.
ruˆ (rvˆ p⇧(x, yˆ)) = ruˆ
✓
@f(yˆ, yˆ)
@y1
◆
+ruˆ
✓
@f(yˆ, yˆ)
@y2
◆
=  @
2f(yˆ, yˆ)
@x1@y1
  @
2f(yˆ, yˆ)
@x2@y2
  @f(yˆ, yˆ)
@x1@y2
  @f(yˆ, yˆ)
@x2@y1
. (3.14)
Equation (3.14) shows that the overall e↵ect on p⇧(x, yˆ) induced by this mismatch is
unambiguously negative and larger than that induced by an opposite-directional mismatch.
This is because her higher attributes are more valuable when interacted with her soul
mate’s, also higher, attributes.6
In sum, the following can be concluded. Individuals have single-peaked mating prefer-
ences, which peak at their soul mate partners. Away from these, they particularly dislike
partners who are either more or less attractive than themselves on both attributes. Thus,
conditional on mismatching, they still aim for some sort of balance, in the sense that they
prefer mismatches on a given attribute to be counterbalanced by an opposite mismatch
on the other attribute.
Proposition 2 (Compensatory Mismatches). In a two-dimensional marriage market
with transferable utility, where individuals attributes are uniformly distributed on the unit
square, and the geometric average within-attribute complementarity is greater than the geo-
metric average between-attribute complementarity: away from their ideal partners, individ-
uals are willing to counterbalance a mismatch on one attribute with an opposite mismatch
on the other attribute.
6The results for  1 =  2 < 0 are exactly the same, only the interpretation changes. In that case, his
payo↵ drops because the reduction in the joint output function from matching with a woman less attractive
than him on both attributes more than outweighs the reduction in her outside option payo↵.
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3.5 Parametric Example
3.5.1 Multidimensional Assortative Matching
The main goal here is to derive closed-form expressions for the males’ and females’ payo↵s
along the competitive equilibrium path, i.e. p?(x) and q?(y) respectively. Consider thus
the following quadratic joint production function
f(x,y) = x0Ay, (3.15)
where x = (x1, x2), y = (y1, y2), and A is a 2-by-2 matrix, with Aij = @2f(x,y)/@xi@yj >
0. That is, A is the a nity matrix and both attributes are assumed to be complementary.
I further assume that this matrix is positive definite, i.e. A11A22 > A12A21.
A woman y chooses a male x in order to maximize her share of the marital payo↵
f(x,y)  p(x). The two first-order conditions of this problem are given by
px1(x) = A11y1 +A12y2 (3.16a)
px2(x) = A22y2 +A21y1, (3.16b)
which have to hold along the competitive equilibrium path µ(x). Since I have assumed
that A11A22 > A12A21, I know from the previous analysis that the competitive equilibrium
entails likes sorting with likes along both attributes, i.e. (y1, y2) = µ(x) = (x1, x2).
Substituting this into the first-order conditions (3.16a) and (3.16b) gives
px1(x) = A11x1 +A12x2 (3.17a)
px2(x) = A22x2 +A21x1. (3.17b)
In order to exist, the system of prices p(x) that decentralizes this assignment must
thus simultaneously satisfy (3.17a) and (3.17b). Partially integrating (3.17a) with respect
to x1, yields
p(x) = A11
x12
2
+A12x1x2 + c2(x2), (3.18)
which cannot yet be the true price-schedule as I still need to find an expression for the
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function c2(x2). To do so, I can partially di↵erentiate (3.18) with respect to x2, to obtain
px2(x) = A12x1 + c
0
2(x2), (3.19)
which, in turn, must be equal to (3.17b). Thus, I have that
c0(x2) = A22x2 + (A21  A12)x1. (3.20)
Now, clearly, I can only integrate c0(x2) back to c(x2) if A21 = A12, i.e. if the a nity
matrix is symmetric. Thus, letting A12 = A21, I obtain
c(x2) = A22
x22
2
+ c, (3.21)
where c is a constant of integration (which I assume to be equal to zero).
Substituting (3.21) into (3.18) yields the price schedule for males along the competitive
equilibrium path
p(x) = A11
x12
2
+A22
x22
2
+A12x1x2. (3.22)
An analogous argument shows that the price schedule for females along the competitive
equilibrium path is given by
q(y) = A11
y12
2
+A22
y22
2
+A12y1y2. (3.23)
3.5.2 Mating Preferences Across Potential Partners
I can now derive closed-form expressions for individuals’ payo↵ functions across the entire
set of potential partners. Substituting the assumed specification for the joint output func-
tion, given by equation (3.15), and the males’ and females’ payo↵s along the competitive
equilibrium path, given by equations (3.22) and (3.23) respectively, into the generic males’
marital payo↵ function, given by equation (3.8), gives
p⇧(x,x+  ) =
1
2

A11
✓
x21  
 21
2
◆
+A22
✓
x22  
 21
2
◆
+ 2A12
✓
x1x2    1 2
2
◆ 
. (3.24)
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Expression (3.24) reveals that the contours of the marital payo↵ function of a given
male x as a function of the distance to the female he potentially matches with, ( 1,  2) =
(y1   x1, y2   x2) 2 [ 1, 1]2), are concentric oblique ellipses around his optimal partner in
the perfectly competitive market, i.e. with centre at   = 0. Figure 3.2 illustrates these
contours for a given male x.
Each elliptical contour represents a set of equally attractive partners. The gain in the
marital payo↵ function increases as the ellipse gets smaller. Individuals thus display a
clear preference for likes, i.e. for mates with similar attributes, since their marital payo↵s
increase the smaller the distance between their potential partners’ attributes and their own
attributes. The rotated or oblique shape of the ellipses captures the finding summarized in
Proposition 2 that individuals have a stronger aversion for partners who are either more or
less attractive than themselves on both traits, than for partners who are more attractive
than themselves on one attribute but less attractive on the other attribute. A mismatch
of the former type (same-directional mismatch) entails a larger reduction in the marital
surplus than a mismatch of the latter type (opposite-directional mismatch). Observe that
this is so because there are non-zero between-attribute complementarities, i.e. A12 6= 0.
If searching for a partner entails an explicit search cost as in Atakan (2006), then this
male x will accept any partner whose attractiveness does not follow below some minimum
threshold. In our example, this minimum quality is given by the red contour in Figure
3.2. Given transferable utility, this male will thus in equilibrium match with any female
located in the region inside that contour.
3.6 Conclusion
Gary Becker (1973) has shown that in a unidimensional context if (say) partners’ edu-
cational levels are complementary, then better educated females will match with better
educated males. But suppose that (say) partners’ looks also complement each other. Can
we conclude than the equilibrium assigment entails positive assortative matching on both
dimensions? That is, that better educated males match with better educated females, and
more attractive males match with more attractive females?
This paper shows that the answer to this question is: not necessarily. This is because
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when multiple traits are simultaneously taken into account, it may well be the case that
the gain of matching better educated individuals with each other and good looking in-
dividuals with each other, is outweighed by the gain of cross matching better educated
individuals with good looking individuals. Hence, assortative matching on both education
and looks only emerges if the within-traits complementarities (complementarity between
partners’ educational levels, and complementarity between partners’ looks) outweighs the
between-traits complementarities (complementarity between his education and her looks,
and complementarity between his looks and her education).
This paper further examines in closed form the sorting trade-o↵s that agents face
outside the equilibrium path, allowing me to characterize their iso-attractiveness curves in
the marriage market. An interesting direction for further research would be to extend my
model into an empirical framework that would allow the identification and estimation of
agents’ iso-attractivenes maps in the marriage market, and ultimately of complementarities
in the marital output function, as Choo and Siow (2006), Galichon and Salani (2012), and
Dupuy and Galichon (2012), do but without providing a closed form.
3.A Appendix: Figures
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Figure 3.1: Within and between positive assortative matching
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